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ABSTRACT. This paper studies game-type credit default swaps that allow the protection buyer and seller to
raise or reduce their respective positions once prior to default. This leads to the study of an optimal stopping
game subject to early default termination. Under a structural credit risk model based on spectrally negative Le´vy
processes, we apply the principles of smooth and continuous fit to identify the equilibrium exercise strategies
for the buyer and the seller. We then rigorously prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium and compute the
contract value at equilibrium. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the impacts of default risk and
other contractual features on the players’ exercise timing at equilibrium.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Credit default swaps (CDSs) are among the most liquid and widely used credit derivatives for trading and
managing default risks. Under a vanilla CDS contract, the protection buyer pays a periodic premium to the
protection seller in exchange for a payment if the reference entity defaults before expiration. In order to
control the credit risk exposure, investors can adjust the premium and notional amount prior to default by
appropriately combining a market-traded default swaption with a vanilla CDS position, or use the over-the-
counter traded products such as the callable CDSs (see [9, Chapter 21]). In a recent related work [27], we
studied the optimal timing to step up or down a CDS position under a general Le´vy credit risk model.
The current paper studies the game-type CDSs that allow both the protection buyer and seller to change
the swap position once prior to default. Specifically, in the step-up (resp. step-down) default swap game, as
soon as the buyer or the seller, whoever first, exercises prior to default, the notional amount and premium
will be increased (resp. decreased) to a pre-specified level upon exercise. From the exercise time till default,
the buyer will pay the new premium and the seller is subject to the new default liability. Hence, for a given
set of contract parameters, the buyer’s objective is to maximize the expected net cash flow while the seller
wants to minimize it, giving rise to a two-player optimal stopping game.
We model the default time as the first passage time of a general exponential Le´vy process representing
some underlying asset value. The default event occurs either when the underlying asset value moves con-
tinuously to the lower default barrier, or when it jumps below the default barrier. This is an extension of
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the original structural credit risk approach introduced by Black and Cox [8] where the asset value follows
a geometric Brownian motion. As is well known [13], the incorporation of unpredictable jump-to-default
is useful for explaining a number of market observations, such as the non-zero short-term limit of credit
spreads. Other related credit risk models based on Le´vy and other jump processes include [10, 19, 34].
The default swap game is formulated as a variation of the standard optimal stopping games in the literature
(see, among others, [14, 17] and references therein). However, while typical optimal stopping games end
at the time of exercise by either player, the exercise time in the default swap game does not terminate the
contract, but merely alters the premium forward and the future protection amount to be paid at default
time. In fact, since default may arrive before either party exercises, the game may be terminated early
involuntarily.
The central challenge of the default swap games lies in determining the pair of stopping times that yield
the Nash equilibrium. Under a structural credit risk model based on spectrally negative Le´vy processes, we
analyze and calculate the equilibrium exercise strategies for the protection buyer and seller. In addition, we
determine the equilibrium premium of the default swap game so that the expected discounted cash flows for
the two parties coincide at contract inception.
Our solution approach starts with a decomposition of the default swap game into a combination of a
perpetual CDS and an optimal stopping game with early termination from default. Moreover, we utilize
a symmetry between the step-up and step-down games, which significantly simplifies our analysis as it is
sufficient to study either case. For a general spectrally negative Le´vy process (with a non-atomic Le´vy
measure), we provide the conditions for the existence of the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we derive the
buyer’s and seller’s optimal threshold-type exercise strategies using the principle of continuous and smooth
fit, followed by a rigorous verification theorem via martingale arguments.
For our analysis of the game equilibrium, the scale function and a number of fluctuation identities of
spectrally negative Le´vy processes are particularly useful. Using our analytic results, we provide a bisection-
based algorithm for the efficient computation of the buyer’s and seller’s exercise thresholds as well as the
equilibrium premium, illustrated in a series of numerical examples. Other recent applications of spectrally
negative Le´vy processes include derivative pricing [1, 2], optimal dividend problem [3, 24, 29], and capital
reinforcement timing [16]. We refer the reader to [23] for a comprehensive account.
To our best knowledge, the step-up and step-down default swap games and the associated optimal stop-
ping games have not been studied elsewhere. There are a few related studies on stochastic games driven
by spectrally negative or positive Le´vy processes; see e.g. [4] and [5]. For optimal stopping games driven
by a strong Markov process, we refer to the recent papers by [17] and [31], which study the existence and
mathematical characterization of Nash equilibrium. Other game-type derivatives in the literature include
Israeli/game options [21, 22], defaultable game options [6], and convertible bonds [20, 33].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the default swap game under a
general Le´vy model. In Section 3, we focus on the spectrally negative Le´vy model and analyze the Nash
equilibrium. Section 4 provides the numerical study of the default swap games for the case with i.i.d.
exponential jumps. Section 5 concludes the paper and presents some ideas for future work. All proofs are
given in the Appendix.
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2. GAME FORMULATION
On a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P), we assume there exists a Le´vy process X = {Xt; t ≥ 0} and
denote by F = (Ft)t≥0 the filtration generated by X . The value of the reference entity (a company stock
or other assets) is assumed to evolve according to an exponential Le´vy process St = eXt , t ≥ 0. Following
the Black-Cox [8] structural approach, the default event is triggered by S crossing a lower level D. Without
loss of generality, we can take logD = 0 by shifting the initial value x ∈ R. Henceforth, we shall work
with the default time
σ0 := inf{ t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ 0 },
where inf ∅=∞ by convention. We denote by Px the probability law and Ex the expectation with X0 = x.
We consider a default swap contract that gives the protection buyer and seller an option to change the
premium and notional amount before default for a fee, whoever exercises first. Specifically, the buyer
begins by paying premium at rate p over time for a notional amount α to be paid at default. Prior to default,
the buyer and the seller can select a time to switch to a new premium pˆ and notional amount αˆ. When the
buyer exercises, she is incurred the fee γb to be paid to the seller; when the seller exercises, she is incurred
γs to be paid to the buyer. If the buyer and the seller exercise simultaneously, then both parties pay the fee
upon exercise. We assume that p, pˆ, α, αˆ, γb, γs ≥ 0 (see also Remark 2.2 below).
Let S := {τ ∈ F : τ ≤ σ0 a.s. } be the set of all stopping times smaller than or equal to the default time.
Denote the buyer’s candidate exercise time by τ ∈ S and seller’s candidate exercise time by σ ∈ S , and let
r > 0 be the positive risk-free interest rate. Given any pair of exercise times (σ, τ), the expected cash flow
to the buyer is given by
V (x;σ, τ) := Ex
[
−
∫ τ∧σ
0
e−rtp dt+ 1{τ∧σ<∞}
(
−
∫ σ0
τ∧σ
e−rtpˆ dt
+e−rσ0(αˆ1{τ∧σ<σ0} + α1{τ∧σ=σ0}) + 1{τ∧σ<σ0}e
−r(τ∧σ) (−γb1{τ≤σ} + γs1{τ≥σ}))] . (2.1)
To the seller, the contract value is −V (x;σ, τ). Naturally, the buyer wants to maximize V over τ whereas
the seller wants to minimize V over σ, giving rise to a two-player optimal stopping game.
This formulation covers default swap games with the following provisions:
(1) Step-up Game: if pˆ > p and αˆ > α, then the buyer and the seller are allowed to increase the
notional amount once from α to αˆ and the premium rate from p to pˆ by paying the fee γb (if the
buyer exercises) or γs (if the seller exercises).
(2) Step-down Game: if pˆ < p and αˆ < α, then the buyer and the seller are allowed to decrease the
notional amount once from α to αˆ and the premium rate from p to pˆ by paying the fee γb (if the
buyer exercises) or γs (if the seller exercises). When pˆ = αˆ = 0, we obtain a cancellation game
which allows the buyer and the seller to terminate the contract early.
Our primary objective is to determine the pair of stopping times (σ∗, τ ∗) ⊂ S, called the saddle point,
that constitutes the Nash equilibrium:
V (x;σ∗, τ) ≤ V (x;σ∗, τ ∗) ≤ V (x;σ, τ ∗), ∀σ, τ ∈ S. (2.2)
Remark 2.1. A related concept is the Stackelberg equilibrium, represented by the equality V ∗(x) = V∗(x),
where V ∗(x) := infσ∈S supτ∈S V (x;σ, τ) and V∗(x) := supτ∈S infσ∈S V (x;σ, τ). See e.g. [17] and [31].
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These definitions imply that V ∗(x) ≥ V∗(x). The existence of the Nash equilibrium (2.2) will also yield the
Stackelberg equilibrium via the reverse inequality:
V ∗(x) ≤ sup
τ∈S
V (x;σ∗, τ) ≤ V (x;σ∗, τ ∗) ≤ inf
σ∈S
V (x;σ, τ ∗) ≤ V∗(x).
Herein, we shall focus our analysis on the Nash equilibrium.
Our main results on the Nash equilibrium are summarized in Theorems 3.1-3.2 for the spectrally negative
Le´vy case. As preparation, we begin our analysis with two useful observations, namely, the decomposition
of V and the symmetry between the step-up and step-down games.
2.1. Decomposition and Symmetry. In standard optimal stopping games, such as the well-known Dynkin
game [14], random payoffs are realized at either player’s exercise time. However, our default swap game
is not terminated at the buyer’s or seller’s exercise time. In fact, upon exercise only the contract terms will
change, and there will be a terminal transaction at default time. Since default may arrive before either party
exercises the step-up/down option, the game may be terminated early involuntarily. Therefore, we shall
transform the value function V into another optimal stopping game that is more amenable for analysis.
First, we define the value of a (perpetual) CDS with premium rate p and notional amount α by
C(x; p, α) := Ex
[
−
∫ σ0
0
e−rtp dt+ α e−rσ0
]
=
(p
r
+ α
)
ζ(x)− p
r
, x > 0, (2.3)
where
ζ(x) := Ex
[
e−rσ0
]
, x ∈ R, (2.4)
is the Laplace transform of σ0. Next, we extract this CDS value from the value function V . Let
α˜ := α− αˆ and p˜ := p− pˆ. (2.5)
Proposition 2.1 (decomposition). For every σ, τ ∈ S and x > 0, the value function admits the decomposi-
tion
V (x;σ, τ) = C(x; p, α) + v(x;σ, τ),
where v(x;σ, τ) ≡ v(x;σ, τ ; p˜, α˜, γb, γs) is defined by
v(x;σ, τ ; p˜, α˜, γb, γs) := Ex
[
e−r(τ∧σ)
(
h(Xτ )1{τ<σ} + g(Xσ)1{τ>σ} + f(Xτ )1{τ=σ}
)
1{τ∧σ<∞}
]
, (2.6)
with
h(x) ≡ h(x; p˜, α˜, γb) := 1{x>0}
[( p˜
r
− γb
)
−
( p˜
r
+ α˜
)
ζ(x)
]
, (2.7)
g(x) ≡ g(x; p˜, α˜, γs) := 1{x>0}
[( p˜
r
+ γs
)
−
( p˜
r
+ α˜
)
ζ(x)
]
, (2.8)
f(x) ≡ f(x; p˜, α˜, γb, γs) := 1{x>0}
[( p˜
r
− γb + γs
)
−
( p˜
r
+ α˜
)
ζ(x)
]
. (2.9)
Comparing (2.3) and (2.7), we see that h(x) = 1{x>0}(C(x;−p˜,−α˜) − γb), which means that the buyer
receives the CDS value C(x;−p˜,−α˜) at the cost of γb if she exercises before the seller. For the seller, the
payoff of exercising before the buyer is −g(x) = 1{x>0}(C(x; p˜, α˜)− γs). Hence, in both cases the fees γb
and γs can be viewed as strike prices.
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Since C(x; p, α) does not depend on (σ, τ), Proposition 2.1 implies that finding the saddle point (σ∗, τ ∗)
for the Nash equilibrium in (2.2) is equivalent to showing that
v(x;σ∗, τ) ≤ v(x;σ∗, τ ∗) ≤ v(x;σ, τ ∗), ∀σ, τ ∈ S. (2.10)
If the Nash equilibrium exists, then the value of the game is V (x;σ∗, τ ∗) = C(x) + v(x;σ∗, τ ∗), x ∈ R.
According to (2.5), the problem is a step-up (resp. step-down) game when α˜ < 0 and p˜ < 0 (resp. α˜ > 0
and p˜ > 0).
Remark 2.2. If γb = γs = 0, then it follows from (2.7)-(2.9) that h(x) = g(x) = f(x) and
v(x;σ, τ ; p˜, α˜, 0, 0) = Ex
[
e−r(τ∧σ)1{Xτ∧σ>0, τ∧σ<∞}C(Xτ∧σ;−p˜,−α˜)
]
.
In this case, the choice of τ ∗ = σ∗ = 0 yields the equilibrium (2.10) with equalities, so the default swap
game is always trivially exercised at inception by either party. For similar reasons, we also rule out the
trivial case with p˜ = 0 or α˜ = 0 (even with γs+γb > 0). Furthermore, we ignore the contract specifications
with p˜α˜ < 0 since they mean paying more (resp. less) premium in exchange for a reduced (resp. increased)
protection after exercise. Henceforth, we proceed our analysis with p˜α˜ > 0 and γb + γs > 0.
Next, we observe the symmetry between the step-up and step-down games.
Proposition 2.2 (symmetry). For any σ, τ ∈ S, we have v(x;σ, τ ; p˜, α˜, γb, γs) = −v(x; τ, σ;−p˜,−α˜, γs, γb).
Applying Proposition 2.2 to the Nash equilibrium condition (2.10), we deduce that if (σ∗, τ ∗) is the
saddle point for the step-down default swap game with (p˜, α˜, γb, γs), then the reversed pair (τ ∗, σ∗) is the
saddle point for the step-up default swap game with (−p˜,−α˜, γs, γb). Consequently, the symmetry result
implies that it is sufficient to study either the step-down or the step-up default swap game. This significantly
simplifies our analysis. Henceforth, we solve only for the step-down game.
Also, we notice from (2.1) that if α˜ ≤ γs, then the seller’s benefit of a reduced exposure does not exceed
the fee, and therefore, should never exercise. As a result, the valuation problem is reduced to a step-down
CDS studied in [27], and so we exclude it from our analysis here. With this observation and Remark 2.2,
we will proceed with the following assumption without loss of generality:
Assumption 2.1. We assume that α˜ > γs ≥ 0, p˜ > 0 and γb + γs > 0.
2.2. Candidate Threshold Strategies. In the step-down game, the protection buyer has an incentive to
step-down when default is less likely, or equivalently when X is sufficiently high. On the other hand, the
protection seller tends to exercise the step-down option when default is likely to occur, or equivalently when
X is sufficiently small. This intuition leads us to conjecture the following threshold strategies, respectively,
for the buyer and the seller:
τB := inf {t ≥ 0 : Xt /∈ (0, B)} , and σA := inf {t ≥ 0 : Xt /∈ (A,∞)} ,
for B > A > 0. Clearly, σA, τB ∈ S. For B > A > 0, we denote the candidate value function
vA,B(x) := v(x;σA, τB)
= Ex
[
e−r(τB∧σA)
(
h(XτB)1{τB<σA} + g(XσA)1{τB>σA} + f(XτB)1{τB=σA}
)
1{τB∧σA<∞}
]
= Ex
[
e−r(τB∧σA)
(
h(XτB)1{τB<σA} + g(XσA)1{τB>σA}
)
1{τB∧σA<∞}
]
(2.11)
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for every x ∈ R. The last equality follows since τB = σA implies that τB = σA = σ0, and f(Xσ0) = 0 a.s.
In subsequent sections, we will identify the candidate exercise thresholds A∗ and B∗ simultaneously by
applying the principle of continuous and smooth fit:
(continuous fit) vA,B(B−)− h(B) = 0 and vA,B(A+)− g(A) = 0, (2.12)
(smooth fit) v′A,B(B−)− h′(B) = 0 and v′A,B(A+)− g′(A) = 0, (2.13)
if these limits exist.
3. SOLUTION METHODS FOR THE SPECTRALLY NEGATIVE LE´VY MODEL
We now define X to be a spectrally negative Le´vy process with the Laplace exponent
φ(s) := logE0
[
esX1
]
= cs+
1
2
ν2s2 +
∫
(0,∞)
(e−su − 1 + su1{0<u<1}) Π(du), s ∈ R, (3.1)
where c ∈ R, ν ≥ 0 is called the Gaussian coefficient, and Π is a Le´vy measure on (0,∞) such that∫
(0,∞)(1 ∧ u2)Π(du) <∞. See [23, p.212]. It admits a unique decomposition:
X = Xc +Xd (3.2)
where Xc is the continuous martingale (Brownian motion) part and Xd is the jump and drift part of X .
Moreover,
Xd has paths of bounded variation⇐⇒
∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) <∞. (3.3)
If this condition (3.3) is satisfied, then the Laplace exponent simplifies to
φ(s) = µs+
1
2
ν2s2 +
∫
(0,∞)
(e−su − 1) Π(du), s ∈ C, (3.4)
where µ := c +
∫
(0,1)
uΠ(du). Recall that X has paths of bounded variation if and only if ν = 0 and (3.3)
holds. We ignore the case when X is a negative subordinator (decreasing a.s.). This means that we require
µ to be strictly positive if ν = 0 and (3.3) holds. We also assume the following and also Assumption 3.2
below.
Assumption 3.1. We assume that the Le´vy measure Π does not have atoms.
3.1. Main Results. We now state our main results concerning the Nash equilibrium and its associated
saddle point. We will identify the pair of thresholds (A∗, B∗) for the seller and buyer at equilibrium. The
first theorem considers the case A∗ > 0, where the seller exercises at a level strictly above zero.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose A∗ > 0. The Nash equilibrium exists with saddle point (σA∗ , τB∗) satisfying
v(x;σA∗ , τ) ≤ vA∗,B∗(x) ≤ v(x;σ, τB∗), ∀σ, τ ∈ S. (3.5)
Here vA∗,B∗(x) ≡ v(x;σA∗ , τB∗) as in (2.11) and can be expressed in terms of the scale function as
we shall see in Subsection 3.2. In particular, the case B∗ = ∞ reflects that τB∗ = σ0 and vA∗,∞(x) :=
limB↑∞ vA∗,B(x) is the expected value when the buyer never exercises and the seller’s strategy is τA∗ . The
value function can be computed using (3.16) and (3.23) below.
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The caseA∗ = 0 may occur, which is more technical and may not yield the Nash equilibrium. To see why,
we notice that a default happens as soon as X touches zero. Therefore, in the event that X continuously
passes (creeps) through zero, the seller would optimally seek to exercise at a level as close to zero as
possible. Nevertheless, this timing strategy is not admissible, though it can be approximated arbitrarily
closely by admissible stopping times.
As shown in Corollary 3.1 below, the caseA∗ = 0 is possible only if the jump partXd ofX is of bounded
variation (see (3.3)). This is consistent with our intuition because if X jumps downward frequently, then
the seller has the incentive to step down the position at a level strictly above zero. On the other hand, when
ν = 0 (with no Gaussian component), the process X never goes through continuously the level zero, so
even with A∗ = 0 the Nash equilibrium in Theorem 3.1 still holds. In contrast, if ν > 0, then an alternative
form of “equilibrium” is attained, namely,
v(x;σ0+, τ) ≤ v0+,B∗(x) ≤ v(x;σ, τB∗), ∀σ, τ ∈ S, (3.6)
where
v(x;σ0+, τ) := Ex
[
e−rτ (h(Xτ )− (α˜− γs)1{Xτ=0})1{τ<∞}
]
, τ ∈ S,
v0+,B∗(x) := Ex
[
e−rτB∗ (h(XτB∗ )− (α˜− γs)1{XτB∗=0})1{τB∗<∞}
]
.
Here, the functions v(x;σ0+, τ) and v0+,B∗(x) correspond to the limiting case where the seller exercises
arbitrarily close to the default time σ0. However, since the seller cannot predict the default time, this timing
strategy is not admissible and (3.6) is not the Nash equilibrium. In practice, given the buyer’s strategy τB∗ ,
the seller’s value function can be approximated with an ε-optimal strategy by choosing σδ for a sufficiently
low exercise level δ > 0.
Let us summarize our equilibrium results for the case A∗ = 0.
Theorem 3.2. For the case A∗ = 0,
(1) if ν = 0, a Nash equilibrium exists with saddle point (σ0, τB∗) and (3.5) holds;
(2) if ν > 0, then the alternative equilibrium (3.6) holds.
In the remainder of this section, we take the following steps to prove the existence of (A∗, B∗) and
Theorems 3.1-3.2:
(1) In Section 3.2, we express the candidate value function vA,B in terms of the Le´vy scale function.
(2) In Section 3.3, we establish the sufficient conditions for continuous and smooth fit.
(3) In Section 3.4, we show the existence of the candidate optimal thresholds A∗ and B∗ (Theorem 3.3).
(4) In Section 3.5, we verify the optimality of the candidate optimal exercise strategies.
Furthermore, in Section 3.4 we provide an efficient algorithm to compute the pair (A∗, B∗) and vA∗,B∗(x).
Finally, with Theorems 3.1-3.2, the value of the step-down game is recovered by V (x) = C(x) + v(x) by
Proposition 2.1 and that of the step-up game is recovered by V (x) = C(x)− v(x) by Proposition 2.2.
Remark 3.1. For the fair valuation of the default swap game, one may specify P as the risk-neutral pricing
measure. The risk-neutrality condition would require that φ(1) = r so that the discounted asset value is a
(P,F)-martingale. This condition is not needed for our solution approach and equilibrium results.
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3.2. Expressing vA,B using the scale function. In this subsection, we shall summarize the scale function
associated with the process X , and then apply this to compute the candidate value function vA,B(x) defined
in (2.11). For any spectrally negative Le´vy process, there exists a function W (r) : R 7→ R, which is zero on
(−∞, 0) and continuous and strictly increasing on [0,∞). It is characterized by the Laplace transform:∫ ∞
0
e−sxW (r)(x)dx =
1
φ(s)− r , s > Φ(r),
where Φ is the right inverse of φ, defined by
Φ(r) := sup{λ ≥ 0 : φ(λ) = r}.
The function W (r) is often called the (r-)scale function in the literature (see e.g. [23]).
With Φ(r) and W (r), we can define the function WΦ(r) = {WΦ(r)(x);x ∈ R} by
WΦ(r)(x) = e
−Φ(r)xW (r)(x), x ∈ R. (3.7)
As is well known (see [23, Chapter 8]), the function WΦ(r)(x) is increasing, and satisfies
WΦ(r)(x) ↑ 1
φ′(Φ(r))
as x ↑ ∞. (3.8)
From Lemmas 4.3-4.4 of [26], we also summarize the behavior of W (r) in the neighborhood of zero:
W (r)(0) =
{
0, unbounded variation
1
µ
, bounded variation
}
and W (r)
′
(0+) =

2
ν2
, ν > 0
∞, ν = 0 and Π(0,∞) =∞
r+Π(0,∞)
µ2
, compound Poisson
 .
(3.9)
To facilitate calculations, we define the function
Z(r)(x) := 1 + r
∫ x
0
W (r)(y)dy, x ∈ R
which satisfies that
Z(r)(x)
W (r)(x)
x↑∞−−→ r
Φ(r)
; (3.10)
see [23] Exercise 8.5. By Theorem 8.5 of [23], the Laplace transform of σ0 in (2.4) can be expressed as
ζ(x) = Z(r)(x)− r
Φ(r)
W (r)(x), x > 0. (3.11)
Regarding the smoothness of the scale function, Assumption 3.1 guarantees that W (r)(x) is differentiable
on (0,∞) (see, e.g., [12]). By (3.11), Laplace transform function ζ is also differentiable on (0,∞), and
so are the functions h, g, f in (2.7)-(2.9). In this paper, we need the twice differentiability for the case of
unbounded variation.
Assumption 3.2. For the case X is of unbounded variation, we assume that W (r) is twice differentiable on
(0,∞).
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This assumption is automatically satisfied if ν > 0 as in [12], and the same property holds for ζ, h, g, and
f . While this is not guaranteed for the unbounded variation case with ν = 0, it is an assumption commonly
needed when the verification of optimality requires the infinitesimal generator.
Moreover, as in (8.18) of [23],
W (r)
′
(y)
W (r)(y)
≤ W
(r)′(x)
W (r)(x)
and
W
′
Φ(r)(y)
WΦ(r)(y)
≤ W
′
Φ(r)(x)
WΦ(r)(x)
, y > x > 0, (3.12)
and, using (3.8), we deduce that
W (r)
′
(x)
W (r)(x)
=
Φ(r)eΦ(r)xWΦ(r)(x) + e
Φ(r)xW ′Φ(r)(x)
eΦ(r)xWΦ(r)(x)
=
Φ(r)WΦ(r)(x) +W
′
Φ(r)(x)
WΦ(r)(x)
x↑∞−−→ Φ(r). (3.13)
In applying the scale function to compute vA,B(x), we first consider the case 0 < A < B < ∞ and then
extend to the cases A ↓ 0 and B ↑ ∞, namely,
vA,∞(x) := lim
B↑∞
vA,B(x) and v0+,B(x) := lim
A↓0
vA,B(x). (3.14)
For 0 < A < x < B <∞, define
Υ(x;A,B) :=
( p˜
r
− γb
)
Ex
[
e−r(σA∧τB)1{τB<σA}
]
+
( p˜
r
+ γs
)
Ex
[
e−r(σA∧τB)1{τB>σA or σA∧τB=σ0}
]
+ (α˜− γs)Ex
[
e−r(σA∧τB)1{σA∧τB=σ0}
]
.
(3.15)
We observe that vA,B(x)−h(x) and vA,B(x)−g(x) are similar and they possess the common term Υ(x;A,B).
Lemma 3.1. For 0 < A < x < B <∞,
vA,B(x)− h(x) = Υ(x;A,B)−
( p˜
r
− γb
)
,
vA,B(x)− g(x) = Υ(x;A,B)−
( p˜
r
+ γs
)
,
(3.16)
and
Υ(x;A,B) = W (r)(x− A) Ψ(A,B)
W (r)(B − A) +
( p˜
r
+ γs
)
Z(r)(x− A)− (α˜− γs)κ(x;A), (3.17)
where
Ψ(A,B) :=
( p˜
r
− γb
)
−
( p˜
r
+ γs
)
Z(r)(B − A) + (α˜− γs)κ(B;A), 0 < A < B <∞, (3.18)
κ(x;A) :=
∫ ∞
A
Π(du)
∫ u∧x−A
0
dzW (r)(x− z − A)
=
1
r
∫ ∞
A
Π(du)
[
Z(r)(x− A)− Z(r)(x− u)] , x > A > 0. (3.19)
The function Ψ(A,B) as in (3.18) will play a crucial role in the continuous and smooth fit as we discuss
in Subsection 3.3 below and also in the proof of the existence of a pair (A∗, B∗) as in Subsection 3.4.
Now we extend our definition of vA,B for A = 0+ and B =∞ as in (3.14), and then derive the strategies
that attain them. As we shall see in Corollary 3.1 below, our candidate threshold level for the seller A∗ is
always strictly positive if Xd is of unbounded variation whether or not there is a Gaussian component. For
this reason, we consider the limit as A ↓ 0 only when (3.3) is satisfied.
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In view of (3.16), the limits in (3.14) can be obtained by extending Υ(x;A,B) with A ↓ 0 and B ↑ ∞;
namely we take limits in (3.17). Here Ψ as in (3.18) explodes as B ↑ ∞ and hence we define an extended
version of Ψ(A,B)/W (r)(B − A) by, for any 0 ≤ A < B ≤ ∞ (with the assumption ∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) <∞ for
A = 0),
Ψ̂(A,B) :=
{
1
W (r)(B−A)
[(
p˜
r
− γb
)− ( p˜
r
+ γs
)
Z(r)(B − A) + (α˜− γs)κ(B;A)
]
, B <∞,
1
Φ(r)
(−(p˜+ rγs) + (α˜− γs)ρ(A)) , B =∞,
(3.20)
where
ρ(A) :=
∫ ∞
A
Π(du)
(
1− e−Φ(r)(u−A)) = ∫ ∞
0
Π(du+ A)
(
1− e−Φ(r)u) , A ≥ 0
and
κ(x; 0) :=
∫ ∞
0
Π(du)
∫ u∧x
0
dzW (r)(x− z) = 1
r
∫ ∞
0
Π(du)
[
Z(r)(x)− Z(r)(x− u)] , x > 0. (3.21)
Here, ρ(0) =
∫∞
0
Π(du)
(
1− e−Φ(r)u) is finite if and only if (3.3) holds. Clearly, Ψ̂(A,B) = Ψ(A,B)
W (r)(B−A)
when 0 < A < B <∞. We shall confirm the convergence results and other auxiliary results below.
Lemma 3.2. For any fixed x > 0,
(1) κ(x;A) is monotonically decreasing in A on (0, x),
(2) if
∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) <∞, then κ(x; 0) = limA↓0 κ(x;A) <∞,
(3) for every A > 0 (extended to A ≥ 0 if ∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) <∞), κ(x;A)
W (r)(x−A)
x↑∞−−→ ρ(A)
Φ(r)
.
Lemma 3.3. (1) We have limB↑∞ Ψ̂(A,B) = Ψ̂(A,∞) for every A > 0 (extended to A ≥ 0 if∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) <∞).
(2) When
∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) <∞, for every 0 < B <∞ and 0 < B ≤ ∞, respectively,
lim
A↓0
Ψ(A,B) =
( p˜
r
− γb
)
−
( p˜
r
+ γs
)
Z(r)(B) + (α˜− γs)κ(B; 0) =: Ψ(0, B), (3.22)
and Ψ̂(0, B) = limA↓0 Ψ̂(A,B).
(3) For every A > 0 (extended to A ≥ 0 if ∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) <∞), Ψ(A,A+) < 0.
Using the above, for 0 < A < x, we obtain the limit
Υ(x;A,∞) := lim
B↑∞
Υ(x;A,B) = W (r)(x− A)Ψ̂(A,∞) +
( p˜
r
+ γs
)
Z(r)(x− A)− (α˜− γs)κ(x;A),
(3.23)
and, for 0 < x < B ≤ ∞,
Υ(x; 0+, B) := lim
A↓0
Υ(x;A,B) = W (r)(x)Ψ̂(0, B) +
( p˜
r
+ γs
)
Z(r)(x)− (α˜− γs)κ(x; 0). (3.24)
In summary, we have expressed vA,B including its limits in (3.14) in terms of the scale function.
Remark 3.2. We note that vA,B(x) is C1(A,B) and in particular C2(A,B) when X is of unbounded
variation. Indeed, κ(x;A) is C1(A,B) and in particular C2(A,B) when X is of unbounded variation.
See also the discussion immediately before and after Assumption 3.2 for the same smoothness property on
(0,∞)\[A,B].
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We now construct the strategies that achieve vA,∞(x) and v0+,B(x). As the following remark shows,
the interpretation of the former is fairly intuitive and it is attained when the buyer never exercises and his
strategy is σ0.
Remark 3.3. By (3.11) and Lemma 3.4 of [27], respectively, we have, for anyA > 0, Ex [e−rσA ] = Z(r)(x−
A) − r
Φ(r)
W (r)(x − A) and Ex [e−rσA1{σA=σ0<∞}] = W (r)(x− A)ρ(A)Φ(r) − κ(x;A) and hence it can be
confirmed from (3.23) that
Υ(x;A,∞) =
( p˜
r
+ γs
)
Ex
[
e−rσA
]
+ (α˜− γs)Ex
[
e−rσA1{σA=σ0<∞}
]
,
which corresponds to the value when the buyer’s strategy is σ0 and the seller’s strategy is σA.
On the other hand, v0+,B(x) is slightly more difficult to understand. Suppose we substituteA = 0 directly
into (3.15) (or the seller never exercises and her strategy is σ0), we obtain
Υ(x; 0, B) :=
( p˜
r
− γb
)
Ex
[
e−rτB1{τB<σ0, τB<∞}
]
+
( p˜
r
+ α˜
)
Ex
[
e−rτB1{τB=σ0<∞}
]
, 0 < B ≤ ∞.
As shown in Remark 3.4 below, Υ(x; 0, B) matches Υ(x; 0+, B) if and only if there is not a Gaussian
component. Upon the existence of Gaussian component, there is a positive probability of continuously
down-crossing (creeping) zero, and the seller tends to exercise immediately before it reaches zero rather
than not exercising at all.
Remark 3.4. The right-hand limit Υ(x; 0+, B) := limA↓0 Υ(x;A,B) is given by
Υ(x; 0+, B) = Υ(x; 0, B)− (α˜− γs)Ex
[
e−rτB1{XτB=0, τB<∞}
]
, 0 < x < B ≤ ∞. (3.25)
Therefore, Υ(x;A,B)
A↓0−−→ Υ(x; 0, B) if and only if the Gaussian coefficient ν = 0.
Upon the existence of a Gaussian component, Υ(x; 0, B) > Υ(x; 0+, B), but there does not exist a
seller’s strategy that attains v0+,B. However, for any ε > 0, the ε-optimal strategy (when the buyer’s
strategy is τB) can be attained by choosing a sufficiently small level. Without a Gaussian component,
Υ(x; 0, B) = Υ(x; 0+, B) and the seller may choose σ0.
3.3. Continuous and Smooth Fit. We shall now find the candidate thresholds A∗ and B∗ by continuous
and smooth fit. As we will show below, the continuous and smooth fit conditions (2.12)-(2.13) will yield
the equivalent conditions Ψ(A∗, B∗) = ψ(A∗, B∗) = 0 where
ψ(A,B) :=
∂
∂B
Ψ(A,B) = −W (r)(B − A) (p˜+ γsr) + (α˜− γs)
∫ ∞
A
Π(du)
(
W (r)(B − A)−W (r)(B − u)) ,
for all 0 < A < B <∞. Here the second equality holds because for every x > A > 0
Z(r)
′
(x− A) = rW (r)(x− A) and κ′(x;A) =
∫ ∞
A
Π(du)
(
W (r)(x− A)−W (r)(x− u)) , (3.26)
where the latter holds because Z(r)′(x) = rW (r)(x) on R\{0} and Z(r) is continuous on R.
As in the case of Ψ(A, ·), it can be seen that ψ(A, ·) also tends to explode as B ↑ ∞ with A fixed. For
this reason, we also define the extended version of ψ(A,B)/W (r)(B − A) by, for any 0 ≤ A < B ≤ ∞
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(with the assumption
∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) <∞ for A = 0),
ψ̂(A,B) :=
{
− (p˜+ γsr) + (α˜− γs)
∫∞
A
Π(du)
(
1− W (r)(B−u)
W (r)(B−A)
)
, B <∞,
− (p˜+ rγs) + (α˜− γs)ρ(A), B =∞.
(3.27)
The convergence results as A ↓ 0 and B ↑ ∞ as well as some monotonicity properties are discussed below.
Lemma 3.4. (1) For fixed 0 < B ≤ ∞, ψ̂(A,B) is decreasing in A on (0, B), and in particular when∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) <∞, ψ̂(0, B) = limA↓0 ψ̂(A,B).
(2) For fixed A > 0 (extended to A ≥ 0 if ∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) < ∞), ψ̂(A,B) is decreasing in B on (A,∞)
and ψ̂(A,B) ↓ ψ̂(A,∞) as B ↑ ∞.
(3) The relationship ψ(0, B) = ∂Ψ(0, B)/∂B also holds for any 0 < B < ∞ given ∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) < ∞
where Ψ(0, B) is defined as in (3.22) and
ψ(0, B) := W (r)(B)
[
− (p˜+ γsr) + (α˜− γs)
∫ ∞
0
Π(du)
(
1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B)
)]
.
Figure 1 gives numerical plots of Ψ(A, ·), Ψ̂(A, ·), ψ(A, ·) and ψ̂(A, ·) for various values of A > 0.
Lemma 3.4-(1,2) and the fact that ψ̂(A,B) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ψ(A,B) ≥ 0 imply that, given a fixed A, there are
three possible behaviors for Ψ:
(a) For small A, Ψ(A,B) is monotonically increasing in B.
(b) For large A, Ψ(A,B) is monotonically decreasing in B.
(c) Otherwise Ψ(A,B) first increases and then decreases in B.
The behavior of Ψ has implications for the existence and uniqueness of A∗ and B∗, as shown in Theorem
3.3 and Lemma 3.5 below. Besides, it can be confirmed that Ψ̂(A, ·) and ψ̂(A, ·) converge as B ↑ ∞
as in Lemmas 3.3-(1) and 3.4-(2). We shall see that the continuous/smooth fit conditions (2.12)-(2.13)
require (except for the case A∗ = 0 or B∗ = ∞) that Ψ̂(A∗, B∗) = ψ̂(A∗, B∗) = 0, or equivalently
Ψ(A∗, B∗) = ψ(A∗, B∗) = 0. This is illustrated by the line corresponding to A = 1.6292 in Figure 1.
We begin with establishing the continuous fit condition.
Continuous fit at B: Continuous fit at B is satisfied automatically for all cases since vA,B(B−) − h(B)
exists and
vA,B(B−)− h(B) = Υ(B−;A,B)−
( p˜
r
− γb
)
= 0, 0 < A < B <∞, (3.28)
which also holds when A = 0+ and v0+,B(B−)−h(B) = 0 given
∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) <∞. This is also clear from
the fact that a spectrally negative Le´vy process always creeps upward and hence B is regular for (B,∞) for
any arbitrary level B > 0 (see [23, p.212]).
Continuous fit at A: We examine the limit of vA,B(x)− g(x) as x ↓ A, namely,
vA,B(A+)− g(A) = W (r)(0)Ψ̂(A,B), 0 < A < B ≤ ∞. (3.29)
In view of (3.9), continuous fit at A holds automatically for the unbounded variation case. For the bounded
variation case, the continuous fit condition is equivalent to
Ψ̂(A,B) = 0. (3.30)
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FIGURE 1. Illustration of Ψ(A,B), Ψ̂(A,B), ψ(A,B), and ψ̂(A,B) as functions of B.
We now pursue the smooth fit condition. Substituting (3.26) into the derivative of (3.17), we obtain
v′A,B(x)− h′(x) = v′A,B(x)− g′(x) = Υ′(x;A,B) = W (r)
′
(x− A)Ψ̂(A,B)− ψ(A, x), (3.31)
for every 0 < A < x < B ≤ ∞ (extended to A = 0+ when ∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) <∞).
Smooth fit at B: With (3.31), the smooth fit condition v′A,B(B−)− h′(B) = 0 at B <∞ amounts to
∂
∂B
Ψ̂(A,B) = 0
because
W (r)
′
(B − A)Ψ̂(A,B)− ψ(A,B) = −W (r)(B − A)
(
ψ̂(A,B)− W
(r)′(B − A)
W (r)(B − A) Ψ̂(A,B)
)
and
∂
∂B
Ψ̂(A,B) = ψ̂(A,B)− W
(r)′(B − A)
W (r)(B − A) Ψ̂(A,B). (3.32)
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For the case A = 0+ and
∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) < ∞, the smooth fit condition v′0+,B(B−) − h′(B) = 0 requires
∂
∂B
Ψ̂(0, B) = 0, which is well-defined by Lemmas 3.3-(2) and 3.4-(1) and (3.32).
Smooth fit at A: Assuming that it has paths of unbounded variation (W (r)(0) = 0), then we obtain
v′A,B(A+)− g′(A) = W (r)
′
(0+)Ψ̂(A,B), 0 < A < B ≤ ∞.
Therefore, (3.30) is also a sufficient condition for smooth fit at A for the unbounded variation case.
We conclude that
(1) if Ψ̂(A,B) = 0, then continuous fit at A holds for the bounded variation case and both continuous
and smooth fit at A holds for the unbounded variation case;
(2) if ∂
∂B
Ψ̂(A,B) = 0, then both continuous and smooth fit conditions at B hold for all cases.
If both Ψ̂(A,B) = 0 and ∂
∂B
Ψ̂(A,B) = 0 are satisfied, then ψ̂(A,B) = 0 automatically follows by (3.32).
3.4. Existence and Identification of (A∗, B∗). In the previous subsection, we have derived the defining
equations for the candidate pair (A∗, B∗). Nevertheless, the computation of (A∗, B∗) is non-trivial and
depends on the behaviors of functions Ψ(A,B) and ψ(A,B). In this subsection, we prove the existence of
(A∗, B∗) and provide a procedure to calculate their values.
Recall from Lemma 3.4-(1) that ψ̂(A,∞) is decreasing inA and observe that ψ̂(A,A+) := limx↓A ψ̂(A, x) =
−(p˜+ rγs) + (α˜− γs)Π(A,∞) is also decreasing in A. Hence, let A and A be the unique values such that
ψ̂(A,∞) ≡ − (p˜+ rγs) + (α˜− γs)ρ(A) = 0, (3.33)
ψ̂(A,A+) ≡ − (p˜+ rγs) + (α˜− γs)Π(A,∞) = 0, (3.34)
upon existence; we set the former zero if ψ̂(A,∞) < 0 for all A ≥ 0 and also set the latter zero if
ψ̂(A,A+) < 0 for any A ≥ 0. Since ρ(A) ↓ 0 and Π(A,∞) ↓ 0 as A ↑ ∞, A and A are finite. In addition,
ρ(A) < Π(A,∞) implies that A ≥ A.
Define for every A ≤ A ≤ A,
b(A) := inf{B > A : Ψ̂(A,B) ≥ 0} ≡ inf {B > A : Ψ(A,B) ≥ 0} ,
b(A) := inf{B > A : ψ̂(A,B) ≤ 0} ≡ inf {B > A : ψ(A,B) ≤ 0} ,
b(A) := inf{B > A : Ψ̂(A,B)− ψ̂(A,B)W
(r)(B − A)
W (r)′(B − A) ≥ 0},
(3.35)
where we assume inf ∅ =∞. For b(A) above, we recall from (3.32) that
Ψ̂(A,B)− ψ̂(A,B)W
(r)(B − A)
W (r)′(B − A) = 0⇐⇒
∂
∂B
Ψ̂(A,B) = 0. (3.36)
Also, using Lemmas 3.3-(1) and 3.4-(2) and that Φ(r)Ψ̂(A,∞) = ψ̂(A,∞) (see (3.13), (3.20), and (3.27)),
we obtain the limit
lim
B↑∞
(
Ψ̂(A,B)− ψ̂(A,B)W
(r)(B − A)
W (r)′(B − A)
)
= 0. (3.37)
Next, we show that there always exists a pair (A∗, B∗) belonging to one of the following four cases:
case 1: 0 < A∗ < B∗ <∞ with B∗ = b(A∗) = b(A∗) <∞;
case 2: 0 < A∗ < B∗ =∞ with B∗ = b(A∗) = b(A∗) =∞ and Ψ̂(A∗,∞) = 0;
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case 3: 0 = A∗ < B∗ <∞ with B∗ = b(0) ≤ b(0);
case 4: 0 = A∗ < B∗ =∞ with b(0) =∞ and b(0) =∞.
Theorem 3.3. (1) If A > 0 and b(A) < ∞, then there exists A∗ ∈ (A,A) such that B∗ = b(A∗) =
b(A∗) <∞. This corresponds to case 1.
(2) If A > 0 and b(A) =∞, then A∗ = A and B∗ =∞ satisfy the condition for case 2.
(3) If A = 0, A > 0, and b(0) < b(0), then there exists A∗ ∈ (0, A) such that B∗ = b(A∗) = b(A∗).
This corresponds to case 1.
(4) Suppose (i) A = 0 or (ii) A = 0 and b(0) ≥ b(0). If b(0) < ∞, then A∗ = 0 and B∗ = b(0) satisfy
the condition for case 3. If b(0) =∞, then A∗ = 0 and B∗ =∞ satisfy the condition for case 4.
In particular, from (3.3) and (3.33) we infer that
∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) = ∞ implies A > 0. This together with
Theorem 3.3 leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. If Xd as in (3.2) has paths of unbounded variation, then
∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) =∞ and A∗ > 0.
Remark 3.5. Note that b(A) = b(A) implies b(A) = b(A) = b(A) (even when they are +∞; see (3.37)).
By the construction in (3.35), A∗ and B∗ obtained above must satisfy:
(1) For every A∗ < B < B∗, Ψ̂(A∗, B) < 0 and Ψ̂(A∗, B)− ψ̂(A∗, B) W (r)(B−A∗)
W (r)
′
(B−A∗) < 0.
(2) If A∗ > 0, then Ψ̂(A∗, B∗) = 0 (continuous or smooth fit at A∗ is satisfied).
(3) Ψ̂(A∗, B∗)− ψ̂(A∗, B∗) W (r)(B∗−A∗)
W (r)
′
(B∗−A∗) = 0 (continuous and smooth fit at B
∗ is satisfied, see (3.36)).
In Theorem 3.3-(1,3), we need to further identify (A∗, B∗). To this end, we first observe
Lemma 3.5. (1) b(A) increases in A on (A,A), and (2) b(A) decreases in A on (A,A).
This lemma implies that (i) if b(A) > b(A), then A∗ must lie on (A,A) and (ii) if b(A) < b(A), then A∗
must lie on (A,A). By Lemma 3.5 and Theorem 3.3, the following algorithm, motivated by the bisection
method, is guaranteed to output the pair (A∗, B∗). Here let ε > 0 be the error parameter.
Step 1: Compute A and A.
Step 1-1: If (i) A = 0 or (ii) A = 0 and b(0) ≥ b(0), then stop and conclude that this is case 3 or
4 with A∗ = 0 and B∗ = b(0).
Step 1-2: If A > 0 and b(A) = ∞, then stop and conclude that this is case 2 with A∗ = A and
B∗ =∞.
Step 2: Set A = (A+ A)/2.
Step 3: Compute b(A) and b(A).
Step 3-1: If |b(A) − b(A)| ≤ ε, then stop and conclude that this is case 1 with A∗ = A and
B∗ = b(A) (or B∗ = b(A)).
Step 3-2: If |b(A)− b(A)| > ε and b(A) > b(A), then set A = A and go back to Step 2.
Step 3-3: If |b(A)− b(A)| > ε and b(A) < b(A), then set A = A and go back to Step 2.
3.5. Verification of Equilibrium. We are now ready to prove Theorems 3.1-3.2. Our candidate value
function for the Nash equilibrium is given by (2.11) and (3.14) with A∗ and B∗ obtained by the procedure
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above. By Lemma 3.1,
vA∗,B∗(x) =

h(x), x ≥ B∗
h(x) + (vA∗,B∗(x)− h(x)), A∗ < x < B∗
g(x), x ≤ A∗
 = −
( p˜
r
+ α˜
)
ζ(x) + J(x) (3.38)
where
J(x) :=

p˜
r
− γb, x ≥ B∗,
Υ(x;A∗, B∗), A∗ < x < B∗,
p˜
r
+ γs, 0 < x ≤ A∗,
p˜
r
+ α˜ x ≤ 0.
(3.39)
When A∗ > 0, (σA∗ , τB∗) is the candidate saddle point that attains vA∗,B∗(x). When A∗ = 0, v0+,B∗(x) can
be approximated by (σε, τB∗) for sufficiently small ε > 0. The value of Υ(x;A∗, B∗) can be computed by
(3.17), (3.23) and (3.24).
The proof of Theorems 3.1-3.2 involves the crucial steps:
(i) Domination property
(a) Ex
[
e−r(τ∧σA∗ )vA∗,B∗(Xτ∧σA∗ )1{τ∧σA∗<∞}
] ≥ v(x;σA∗ , τ) for all τ ∈ S;
(b) Ex
[
e−r(σ∧τB∗ )vA∗,B∗(Xσ∧τB∗ )1{σ∧τB∗<∞}
] ≤ v(x;σ, τB∗) for all σ ∈ S;
(ii) Sub/super-harmonic property
(a) (L − r)vA∗,B∗(x) > 0 for every 0 < x < A∗;
(b) (L − r)vA∗,B∗(x) = 0 for every A∗ < x < B∗;
(c) (L − r)vA∗,B∗(x) < 0 for every x > B∗.
Here L is the infinitesimal generator associated with the process X
Lf(x) = cf ′(x) + 1
2
ν2f ′′(x) +
∫ ∞
0
[
f(x− z)− f(x) + f ′(x)z1{0<z<1}
]
Π(dz)
applied to any bounded and sufficiently smooth function f that is C2 when X is of unbounded variation and
C1 otherwise.
After establishing (i)-(ii) above, we will apply them to establish (2.10) by showing for the candidate
optimal thresholds (A∗, B∗) that
v(x;σA∗ , τ) ≤ vA∗,B∗(x) ≤ v(x;σ, τB∗), ∀σ, τ ∈ S. (3.40)
Remark 3.6. In fact, it is sufficient to show (3.40) holds for all τ ∈ SA∗ and σ ∈ SB∗ , where
SA∗ := {τ ∈ S : Xτ /∈ (0, A∗] a.s.} and SB∗ := {σ ∈ S : Xσ /∈ [B∗,∞) a.s.} . (3.41)
Indeed, for any candidate τ ∈ S, it follows that v(x;σA∗ , τ) ≤ v(x;σA∗ , τˆ) where τˆ := τ1{Xτ /∈(0,A∗]} +
σ01{Xτ∈(0,A∗]} ∈ SA∗ , so the buyer’s optimal exercise time τ ∗ must belong to SA∗ . This is intuitive since
the seller will end the game as soon as X enters (0, A∗] and hence the buyer should not needlessly stop in
this interval and pay γb. Similar arguments apply to the use of SB∗ . Then, using the same arguments as for
(2.11), we can again safely eliminate the f(·) term in (2.6) and write
v(x;σA∗ , τ) = Ex
[
e−r(τ∧σA∗ )
(
h(Xτ )1{τ<σA∗} + g(XσA∗ )1{τ>σA∗}
)
1{τ∧σA∗<∞}
]
, τ ∈ SA∗ ,
v(x;σ, τB∗) = Ex
[
e−r(τB∗∧σ)
(
h(XτB∗ )1{τB∗<σ} + g(Xσ)1{τB∗>σ}
)
1{τB∗∧σ<∞}
]
, σ ∈ SB∗ .
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We prove properties (i)-(ii) above using the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.6. For every x ∈ (A∗, B∗), the following inequalities hold:
vA∗,B∗(x)− g(x) ≤ 0, (3.42)
vA∗,B∗(x)− h(x) ≥ 0, (3.43)
where it is understood for the case A∗ = 0 and ν > 0 that the above results hold with A∗ = 0+.
Applying this lemma and the definitions of SA∗ and SB∗ in (3.41) of Remark 3.6, we obtain
Lemma 3.7. Fix x > 0.
(1) For every τ ∈ SA∗ , when A∗ > 0
g(XσA∗ )1{σA∗<τ} + h(Xτ )1{τ<σA∗} ≤ vA∗,B∗(XσA∗∧τ ), Px-a.s. on {σA∗ ∧ τ <∞},
and when A∗ = 0,
−(α˜− γs)1{Xτ=0} + h(Xτ )1{τ<σ0} ≤ v0+,B∗(Xτ ), Px-a.s. on {τ <∞}.
(2) For every σ ∈ SB∗ ,
g(Xσ)1{σ<τB∗} + h(XτB∗ )1{τB∗<σ} ≥ vA∗,B∗(Xσ∧τB∗ ), Px-a.s. on {σ ∧ τB∗ <∞},
where it is understood for the case A∗ = 0 and ν > 0 that the above holds with A∗ = 0+.
Lemma 3.8. (1) When A∗ > 0, we have (L − r)vA∗,B∗(x) > 0 for every 0 < x < A∗.
(2) We have (L − r)vA∗,B∗(x) = 0 for every A∗ < x < B∗.
(3) When B∗ <∞, we have (L − r)vA∗,B∗(x) < 0 for every x > B∗.
The domination property (i) holds by applying discounting and expectation in Lemma 3.7. The sub/super-
harmonic property (ii) is implied by Lemma 3.8. By Ito’s lemma, this shows that the stopped processes
e−r(t∧σA∗ )vA∗,B∗(Xt∧σA∗ ) and e
−r(t∧τB∗ )vA∗,B∗(Xt∧τB∗ ) are, respectively, a supermartingale and a submartin-
gale. In turn, we apply them to show vA∗,B∗(x) ≥ v(x;σA∗ , τ) for any arbitrary τ ∈ SA∗ , and vA∗,B∗(x) ≤
v(x;σ, τB∗) for any arbitrary σ ∈ SB∗ , that is, the Nash equilibrium. We provide the details of the proofs
for Theorems 3.1-3.2 in the Appendix.
4. EXPONENTIAL JUMPS AND NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we consider spectrally negative Le´vy processes with i.i.d. exponential jumps and provide
some numerical examples to illustrate the buyer’s and seller’s optimal exercise strategies and the impact
of step-up/down fees on the game value. The results obtained here can be extended easily to the hyper-
exponential case using the explicit expression of the scale function obtained by [15], and can be used to
approximate for a general case with a completely monotone density (see, e.g., [15, 18]). Here, however, we
focus on a rather simple case for more intuitive interpretation of our numerical results.
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4.1. Spectrally Negative Le´vy Processes with Exponential Jumps. Let X be a spectrally negative Le´vy
process of the form
Xt −X0 = µt+ νBt −
Nt∑
n=1
Zn, 0 ≤ t <∞.
Here B = {Bt; t ≥ 0} is a standard Brownian motion, N = {Nt; t ≥ 0} is a Poisson process with arrival
rate λ, and Z = {Zn;n = 1, 2, . . .} is an i.i.d. sequence of exponential random variables with density
function f(z) := ηe−ηz, z > 0, for some 0 < η <∞. Its Laplace exponent (3.1) is given by
φ(s) = µs+
1
2
ν2s2 − λ s
η + s
.
For our examples, we assume ν > 0. In this case, there are two negative solutions to the equation φ(s) = r
and their absolute values {ξi,r; i = 1, 2} satisfy the interlacing condition: 0 < ξ1,r < η < ξ2,r < ∞. For
this process, the scale function is given by for every x ≥ 0
W (r)(x) =
2∑
i=1
Ci
[
eΦ(r)x − e−ξi,rx] , (4.1)
for some C1 and C2 (see [15] for their expressions). In addition, applying (4.1) to (3.7) yields
WΦ(r)(x) =
2∑
i=1
Ci
[
1− e−(Φ(r)+ξi,r)x] ,
with the limit WΦ(r)(∞) =
∑2
i=1 Ci, which equals (φ
′(Φ(r)))−1 by (3.8).
Recall that, in contrast to ψ(A,B) and Ψ(A,B), ψ̂(A,B) and Ψ̂(A,B) do not explode. Therefore, they
are used to compute the optimal thresholds A∗ and B∗ and the value function V . Below we provide the
formulas for ψ̂(A,B) and Ψ̂(A,B). The computations are very tedious but straightforward, so we omit the
proofs here.
In summary, for B > A ≥ 0, we have
ψ̂(A,B) = − (p˜+ γsr) + (α˜− γs)λe−ηA − WΦ(r)(∞)
WΦ(r)(B − A)(α˜− γs)λ
η
Φ(r) + η
e−ηA
+
α˜− γs
WΦ(r)(B − A)λe
−Φ(r)(B−A)
2∑
i=1
Ci
[ η
Φ(r) + η
e−ηB +
η
ξi,r − η
(
e−ηB − e−ξi,r(B−A)−ηA) ]
and
Ψ̂(A,B) =
1
WΦ(r)(B − A)
[
WΦ(r)(∞)
(
λe−ηA
α˜− γs
Φ(r) + η
− p˜+ γsr
Φ(r)
)
+ e−Φ(r)(B−A)%(A,B)
]
where
%(A,B) := (α˜− γs)λ
2∑
i=1
Ci
(
e−ηB
[
− 1
Φ(r) + η
+
1
ξi,r − η
]
− e−ηA−ξi,r(B−A) 1
ξi,r − η
)
− (p˜+ γsr)
2∑
i=1
Ci
[
− 1
Φ(r)
+
1
ξi,r
(
e−ξi,r(B−A) − 1) ]− (γb + γs) .
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Also, setting B =∞ and B = A+, (3.33)-(3.34) yield
ψ̂(A,∞) = − (p˜+ γsr) + λ(α˜− γs) Φ(r)
Φ(r) + η
e−ηA and ψ̂(A,A+) = − (p˜+ γsr) + (α˜− γs)λe−ηA.
4.2. Numerical Results. Let us denote the step-up/down ratio by q := pˆ/p = αˆ/α. We consider four
contract specifications:
(C) cancellation game with q = 0 (position canceled at exercise),
(D) step-down game with q = 0.5 (position halved at exercise),
(V) vanilla CDS with q = 1.0 (position unchanged at exercise),
(U) step-up game with q = 1.5 (position raised at exercise).
The model parameters are r = 0.03, λ = 1.0, η = 2.0, ν = 0.2, α = 1, x = 1.5 and γs = γb = 1000 bps,
unless specified otherwise. We also choose µ so that the risk-neutral condition φ(1) = r is satisfied.
Figure 2 shows for all four cases the contract value V to the buyer as a function of x given a fixed premium
rate. It is decreasing in x since default is less likely for higher value of x. For the cancellation game, V takes
the constant values γs = 1000 bps for x ≤ A∗ and −γb = −1000 bps for x ≥ B∗ since in these regions
immediate cancellation with a fee is optimal.
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
x
va
lu
e 
fo
r t
he
 b
uy
er
 
 
q=0.0 (cancellation)
q=0.5 (step-down)
q=1.0 (vanilla)
q=1.5 (step-up)
FIGURE 2. The value for the buyer V (x;σA∗ , τB∗) as a function of x. Here r = 0.03, p = 0.05,
µ = 0.1352, λ = 1.0, η = 2.0, ν = 0.2, and γb = γs = 1000 bps.
In Figure 3, we show the optimal thresholds A∗ and B∗ and the value V with respect to p. The symmetry
argument discussed in Section 2 applies to the cases (D) and (U). As a result, the A∗ in (D) is identical
to the B∗ in (U), and the B∗ in (D) is identical to the A∗ in (U). In all four cases, both A∗ and B∗ are
decreasing in p. In other words, as p increases, the buyer tends to exercise earlier while the seller tends to
delay exercise. Intuitively, a higher premium makes waiting more costly for the buyer but more profitable
for the seller. The value V in the cancellation game stays constant when p is sufficiently small because the
seller would exercise immediately; it also becomes flat when p is sufficiently high because the buyer would
exercise immediately.
Note that the value function V and the optimal stopping strategies (σ∗, τ ∗) depend on the premium rate
p. In particular, we call p∗ the equilibrium premium rate if it yields V (x;σ∗(p∗), τ ∗(p∗)) = 0, where we
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FIGURE 3. (Left) Optimal threshold levels A∗ and B∗ and (right) the value for the buyer with
respect to p. The parameters are r = 0.03, x = 1.5, µ = 0.3433, λ = 0.5, η = 2.0, ν = 0.2, and
γb = γs = 1000 bps.
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FIGURE 4. The equilibrium premium p∗ with respect to γs (left) and γb (right). Here r = 0.03,
x = 1.5, µ = 0.3433, λ = 1.0, η = 2.0, ν = 0.2, and γb = γs = 1000 bps unless specified otherwise.
emphasize the saddle point (σ∗(p∗), τ ∗(p∗)) corresponds to p∗. Hence, under the equilibrium premium rate,
the default swap game starts at value zero, implying no cash transaction between the protection buyer and
seller at contract initiation. As illustrated in Figure 3-(b), the value V (from the buyer’s perspective) is
always decreasing in p. Using a bisection method, we numerically determine the equilibrium premium p∗
so that V = 0. We illustrate in Figure 4 the equilibrium premium p∗ as a function of γb and γs. As is
intuitive, the equilibrium premium p∗ is increasing in γs and decreasing in γb.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed the valuation of a default swap contract where the protection buyer and seller can alter
the respective position once prior to default. This new contractual feature drives the protection buyer/seller
to consider the optimal timing to control credit risk exposure. The valuation problem involves the analytical
and numerical studies of an optimal stopping game with early termination from default. Under a perpetual
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setting, the investors’ optimal stopping rules are characterized by their respective exercise thresholds, which
can be quickly determined in a general class of spectrally negative Le´vy credit risk models.
For future research, it is most natural to consider the default swap game under a finite horizon and/or
different credit risk models. The default swap game studied in this paper can potentially be applied to
approximate its finite-maturity version using the maturity randomization (Canadization) approach (see [11,
25]). Another interesting extension is to allow for multiple adjustments by the buyer and/or seller prior
to default, which can be modeled as stochastic games with multiple stopping opportunities. Finally, the
step-up and step-down features also arise in other derivatives, including interest rate swaps.
APPENDIX A. PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 2.1. First, by a rearrangement of integrals and (2.5), the expression inside the expec-
tation in (2.1) can be written as
1{τ∧σ<∞}
[ ∫ σ0
τ∧σ
e−rtp˜ dt−
∫ σ0
0
e−rtp dt+ e−rσ0
(−α˜1{τ∧σ<σ0} + α)
+ 1{τ∧σ<σ0}e
−r(τ∧σ) (−γb1{τ≤σ} + γs1{τ≥σ}) ]+ 1{τ∧σ=∞}(− ∫ ∞
0
e−rtp dt
)
= 1{τ∧σ<∞}
(∫ σ0
τ∧σ
e−rtp˜ dt− e−rσ0α˜1{τ∧σ<σ0} + 1{τ∧σ<σ0}e−r(τ∧σ)
(−γb1{τ≤σ} + γs1{τ≥σ}) )
−
∫ σ0
0
e−rtp dt+ e−rσ0α
= 1{τ∧σ<∞, τ∧σ<σ0}
(∫ σ0
τ∧σ
e−rtp˜ dt− e−rσ0α˜ + e−r(τ∧σ) (−γb1{τ≤σ} + γs1{τ≥σ}) )− ∫ σ0
0
e−rtp dt+ e−rσ0α.
Taking expectation, (2.1) simplifies to
V (x;σ, τ) = Ex
[
1{τ∧σ<∞, τ∧σ<σ0}
(∫ σ0
τ∧σ
e−rtp˜ dt− e−rσ0α˜ + e−r(τ∧σ) (−γb1{τ≤σ} + γs1{τ≥σ}) )] (A.1)
− Ex
[ ∫ σ0
0
e−rtp dt
]
+ αEx
[
e−rσ0
]
.
Here, the last two terms do not depend on τ nor σ and they constitute C(x; p, α). Next, using the fact that
{τ ∧ σ < σ0, τ ∧ σ <∞} = {Xτ∧σ > 0, τ ∧ σ <∞} for every τ, σ ∈ S and the strong Markov property
of X at time τ ∧ σ, we express the first term as
Ex
[
1{τ∧σ<∞, τ∧σ<σ0}
(
Ex
[ ∫ σ0
τ∧σ
e−rtp˜ dt− e−rσ0α˜
∣∣∣Fτ∧σ]+ e−r(τ∧σ) (−γb1{τ≤σ} + γs1{τ≥σ}) )]
= Ex
[
1{τ∧σ<∞, τ∧σ<σ0}e
−r(τ∧σ) (h(Xτ )1{τ<σ} + g(Xσ)1{τ>σ} + f(Xτ )1{τ=σ})]
= Ex
[
e−r(τ∧σ)
(
h(Xτ )1{τ<σ} + g(Xσ)1{τ>σ} + f(Xτ )1{τ=σ}
)
1{τ∧σ<∞}
]
= v(x;σ, τ),
where the second equality holds because (i) τ < σ or τ > σ implies τ ∧ σ < σ0, and (ii) by f(Xσ0) = 0 we
have f(Xτ )1{τ=σ,τ∧σ<σ0} = f(Xτ )1{τ=σ} a.s. 
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Proof of Proposition 2.2. First, we deduce from (2.7)-(2.9) that
h(x; p˜, α˜, γb) = −g(x;−p˜,−α˜, γb),
g(x; p˜, α˜, γs) = −h(x;−p˜,−α˜, γs),
f(x; p˜, α˜, γb, γs) = −f(x;−p˜,−α˜, γs, γb).
Substituting these equations to (2.6) of Proposition 2.1, it follows, for every τ, σ ∈ S, that
v(x;σ, τ ; p˜, α˜, γb, γs) = −Ex
[
e−r(τ∧σ)
(
h(Xσ;−p˜,−α˜, γs)1{σ<τ} + g(Xτ ;−p˜,−α˜, γb)1{τ<σ}
+f(Xτ∧σ;−p˜,−α˜, γs, γb)1{τ=σ}
)
1{τ∧σ<∞}
]
= −v(x; τ, σ;−p˜,−α˜, γs, γb).

Proof of Lemma 3.1. Recall that v is given by the first expectation of (A.1), and note that σA ∧ τB = ∞
implies σ0 =∞. For every x ∈ (A,B), v(x;A,B)− h(x) equals
Ex
[
1{σA∧τB<∞}
(∫ σ0
σA∧τB
e−rtp˜ dt− e−rσ0α˜1{σA∧τB<σ0} + e−r(σA∧τB)
(−γb1{τB<σA} + γs1{τB>σA}) )]
− Ex
[ ∫ σ0
0
e−rtp˜ dt − e−rσ0α˜
]
+ γb
= Ex
[
1{σA∧τB<∞}
(
−
∫ σA∧τB
0
e−rtp˜ dt+ e−rσ0α˜1{σA∧τB=σ0} + e
−r(σA∧τB) (−γb1{τB<σA} + γs1{τB>σA}) )
− 1{σA∧τB=∞}
(∫ σ0
0
e−rtp˜ dt − e−rσ0α˜
) ]
+ γb
= Ex
[
1{σA∧τB<∞}e
−r(σA∧τB) (α˜1{σA∧τB=σ0} − γb1{τB<σA} + γs1{τB>σA})− ∫ σA∧τB
0
e−rtp˜ dt
]
+ γb,
which equals Υ(x;A,B) − p˜
r
+ γb. Since g(x) = h(x) + γs + γb, ∀x > 0, the second claim of (3.16) is
immediate.
The proof of the second claim amounts to proving the following: for 0 < A < x < B <∞,
Ex
[
e−r(σA∧τB)1{τB<σA}
]
=
W (r)(x− A)
W (r)(B − A) ,
Ex
[
e−r(σA∧τB)1{τB>σA or σA∧τB=σ0}
]
= Z(r)(x− A)− Z(r)(B − A)W
(r)(x− A)
W (r)(B − A) ,
Ex
[
e−r(σA∧τB)1{σA∧τB=σ0}
]
=
W (r)(x− A)
W (r)(B − A)κ(B;A)− κ(x;A).
(A.2)
The first two equalities follow directly from the property of the scale function (see, for example, Theorem
8.1 of [23]). Notice here that τB < σA if and only if it up-crosses B before down-crossing A while τB > σA
or σA ∧ τB = σ0 if and only if it down-crosses A before up-crossing B.
For the third equality, we require the overshoot distribution that is again obtained via the scale function.
Let N be the Poisson random measure for the jumps of −X and X and X be the running maximum and
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minimum, respectively, of X . By compensation formula (see e.g. Theorem 4.4 of [23]), we have
Ex
[
e−r(σA∧τB)1{σA∧τB=σ0}
]
= Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
N(dt× du)e−rt1{Xt−<B, Xt−>A, Xt−−u<0}
]
= Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
dte−rt
∫ ∞
0
Π(du)1{Xt−<B, Xt−>A, Xt−−u<0}
]
=
∫ ∞
0
Π(du)
∫ ∞
0
dt
[
e−rtPx{Xt− < u, σA ∧ τB ≥ t}
]
.
(A.3)
Recall that, as in Theorem 8.7 of [23], the resolvent measure for the spectrally negative Le´vy process killed
upon exiting [0, a] is given by∫ ∞
0
dt
[
e−rtPx {Xt− ∈ dy, σ0 ∧ τa > t}
]
= dy
[
W (r)(x)W (r)(a− y)
W (r)(a)
−W (r)(x− y)
]
, y > 0.
Hence∫ ∞
0
dt
[
e−rtPx {Xt− ∈ dy, σA ∧ τB > t}
]
=
∫ ∞
0
dt
[
e−rtPx−A {Xt− ∈ d(y − A), σ0 ∧ τB−A > t}
]
= dy
[
W (r)(x− A)W (r)(B − y)
W (r)(B − A) −W
(r)(x− y)
]
,
when y > A, and it is zero otherwise. Therefore, for u > A, we have∫ ∞
0
dt
[
e−rtPx{Xt− < u, σA ∧ τB > t}
]
=
∫ u
A
dy
[
W (r)(x− A)W (r)(B − y)
W (r)(B − A) −W
(r)(x− y)
]
=
∫ u−A
0
dz
[
W (r)(x− A)W (r)(B − z − A)
W (r)(B − A) −W
(r)(x− z − A)
]
=
W (r)(x− A)
W (r)(B − A)
∫ u∧B−A
0
dzW (r)(B − z − A)−
∫ u∧x−A
0
dzW (r)(x− z − A)
since W (r) is zero on (−∞, 0). Therefore, Ex [e−r(σA∧τB)1{σA∧τB=σ0}] = W (r)(x−A)W (r)(B−A)κ(B;A) − κ(x;A).
Finally, substituting (A.2) in (3.15), the proof is complete. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2. (1) The monotonicity is clear because ∂κ(x;A)/∂A = −W (r)(x − A)Π(A,∞) < 0
for any x > A > 0.
(2) By (3.8), we have for any u > A∫ u∧x−A
0
dzW (r)(x− z − A) =
∫ u∧x−A
0
dzeΦ(r)(x−z−A)WΦ(r)(x− z − A)
≤ 1
φ′(Φ(r))
∫ u−A
0
dzeΦ(r)(x−z−A) =
eΦ(r)(x−A)
Φ(r)φ′(Φ(r))
(
1− e−Φ(r)(u−A)) .
Therefore,
κ(x;A) ≤ e
Φ(r)(x−A)
Φ(r)φ′(Φ(r))
ρ(A) ≤ e
Φ(r)x
Φ(r)φ′(Φ(r))
ρ(0). (A.4)
Using this with the dominated convergence theorem yields the limit:
κ(x; 0) = lim
A↓0
1
r
∫ ∞
0
Π(du+ A)
[
Z(r)(x− A)− Z(r)(x− A− u)] = 1
r
∫ ∞
0
Π(du)
[
Z(r)(x)− Z(r)(x− u)] ,
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which is finite.
(3) For all x > A ≥ 0
κ(x;A)
W (r)(x− A) =
∫ ∞
A
Π(du)
∫ u∧x−A
0
dz
W (r)(x− z − A)
W (r)(x− A) ≤
∫ ∞
A
Π(du)
∫ u∧x−A
0
e−Φ(r)zdz ≤ ρ(A)
Φ(r)
.
Therefore, the dominated convergence theorem yields the limit:
lim
x↑∞
κ(x;A)
W (r)(x− A) =
1
r
∫ ∞
A
Π(du) lim
x↑∞
Z(r)(x− A)− Z(r)(x− u)
W (r)(x− A) =
ρ(A)
Φ(r)
where the last equality holds by (3.10), Z(r)(x− A)/W (r)(x− A) x↑∞−−→ r/Φ(r) and
lim
x↑∞
Z(r)(x− u)
W (r)(x− A) = limx↑∞ e
−Φ(r)(u−A) Z
(r)(x− u)
W (r)(x− u)
WΦ(r)(x− u)
WΦ(r)(x− A) = e
−Φ(r)(u−A) r
Φ(r)
.

Proof of Lemma 3.3. (1) It is immediate by Lemma 3.2-(3) and (3.10). (2) By Lemma 3.2-(2) and because
ρ(A)
A↓0−−→ ρ(0), the convergence indeed holds. (3) By (A.4), the dominated convergence theorem yields
lim
B↓A
Ψ(A,B) = lim
B↓A
[( p˜
r
− γb
)
−
( p˜
r
+ γs
)
Z(r)(B − A) + (α˜− γs)κ(B;A)
]
= −(γb + γs) < 0.

Proof of Remark 3.4. By Theorem 8.1 of [23], we obtain the limits:
lim
A↓0
Ex
[
e−r(σA∧τB)1{τB<σA,τB∧σA<∞}
]
= Ex
[
e−rτB1{τB<σ0, τB<∞}
]
,
lim
A↓0
Ex
[
e−r(σA∧τB)1{τB>σA or σA∧τB=σ0}1{τB∧σA<∞}
]
= Ex
[
e−rτB1{τB=σ0<∞}
]
.
By the construction of Ex
[
e−r(σA∧τB)1{σA∧τB=σ0<∞}
]
as seen in (A.3) above, we deduce that
lim
A↓0
Ex
[
e−r(σA∧τB)1{σA∧τB=σ0<∞}
]
= Ex
[
e−rτB1{XτB<0,τB<∞}
]
= Ex
[
e−rτB1{τB=σ0<∞}
]− Ex [e−rτB1{XτB=0, τB<∞}] .
Applying these to the definition (3.15) yields:
Υ(x; 0+, B) = Υ(x; 0, B)− (α˜− γs)Ex
[
e−rτB1{XτB=0, τB<∞}
]
.
By [23] Exercise 7.6, a spectrally negative Le´vy process creeps downward, or P {Xσ0 = 0 |σ0 <∞} > 0,
if and only if there is a Gaussian component. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3.4. We first show the following.
Lemma A.1. If
∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) <∞, then we have ∫∞
0
Π(du)
(
1− W (r)(B−u)
W (r)(B)
)
<∞ for any 0 < B <∞.
Proof. Fix B > 0. We have∫ ∞
0
Π(du)
(
1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B)
)
= Π(B,∞) + 1
W (r)(B)
∫ B
0
Π(du)
(
W (r)(B)−W (r)(B − u)) . (A.5)
For any 0 <  < B, we have by the mean value theorem,∫ 
0
(W (r)(B)−W (r)(B − u))Π(du) ≤
∫ 
0
u sup
t∈[B−,B]
W (r)
′
(t)Π(du)
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which is finite because supt∈[B−,B] W (r)
′
(t) <∞ and ∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) <∞. Hence we conclude. 
(1) Suppose B <∞. Since W (r)(B − u)/W (r)(B − A) is increasing in A on (0, B), it follows that
∂
∂A
ψ̂(A,B) = − (α˜− γs)
∫ B
A
Π(du)
∂
∂A
[
W (r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A)
]
< 0, 0 < A < B,
and ψ̂ is decreasing in A on (0, B). The result for B =∞ is immediate because ρ(A) is decreasing.
For the convergence result for B <∞ (when ∫ 1
0
uΠ(du) <∞), we have∫ ∞
A
Π(du)
[
1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A)
]
≤ 1
W (r)(B − A)
∫ ∞
0
Π(du)
[
W (r)(B)−W (r)(B − u)] ,
which is bounded by Lemma A.1. Hence by the dominated convergence theorem,
lim
A↓0
∫ ∞
A
Π(du)
[
1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A)
]
=
∫ ∞
0
lim
A↓0
Π(du+ A)
[
1− W
(r)(B − u− A)
W (r)(B − A)
]
=
∫ ∞
0
Π(du)
[
1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B)
]
.
The convergence result for B =∞ is clear because ρ(A) A↓0−−→ ρ(0).
(2) Suppose A > 0. Look at (3.27) and consider the derivative with respect to B,
∂
∂B
ψ̂(A,B) = − (α˜− γs)
[
pi(B)
W (r)(0)
W (r)(B − A) +
∫ B
A
Π(du)
∂
∂B
W (r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A)
]
where pi is the density of Π. Moreover, for all A < u < B,
∂
∂B
W (r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A) = e
−Φ(r)(u−A) ∂
∂B
WΦ(r)(B − u)
WΦ(r)(B − A)
= e−Φ(r)(u−A)
W ′Φ(r)(B − u)WΦ(r)(B − A)−WΦ(r)(B − u)W ′Φ(r)(B − A)
(WΦ(r)(B − A))2 ≥ 0,
by (3.12). Therefore, ψ̂(A,B) is decreasing in B. This result can be extended to A = 0 as in part (1).
For the convergence result for A > 0, the dominated convergence theorem yields
lim
B→∞
∫ ∞
A
Π(du)
(
1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A)
)
=
∫ ∞
A
Π(du) lim
B→∞
(
1− W
(r)(B − u)
W (r)(B − A)
)
= ρ(A),
where the last equality holds by (3.7)-(3.8).
When A = 0, it also holds by applying the dominated convergence theorem. Indeed, (A.5) is bounded in
B on [B0,∞) for any B0 > 0. To see this, for any 0 < ε < B
1
W (r)(B)
∫ B
0
Π(du)
(
W (r)(B)−W (r)(B − u))
=
eΦ(r)B
W (r)(B)
(∫ B
0
Π(du)WΦ(r)(B)
[
1− e−Φ(r)u]+ ∫ B
0
Π(du)e−Φ(r)u
[
WΦ(r)(B)−WΦ(r)(B − u)
])
≤ e
Φ(r)B
W (r)(B)
(
WΦ(r)(B)ρ(0) +WΦ(r)(B)Π(ε, B) + α(B; ε)
)
,
with α(B; ε) :=
∫ ε
0
Π(du)
[
WΦ(r)(B)−WΦ(r)(B − u)
]
. Moreover for any B > B0 > ε, by the mean value
theorem, α(B; ε) ≤ ∫ ε
0
u supt≥B0−εW
′
Φ(r)(t)Π(du) which is finite because supt≥B0−εW
′
Φ(r)(t) < ∞ and
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0
uΠ(du) < ∞. This together with W (r)(x) ∼ eΦ(r)x/φ′(Φ(r)) as x ↑ ∞ shows that (A.5) is bounded in
B on [B0,∞).
(3) The derivative of (3.21) can go into the integral by the dominated convergence theorem because
1
r
∫∞
0
Π(du)
∣∣Z(r)′(B)− Z(r)′(B − u)∣∣ = ∫∞
0
Π(du)
(
W (r)(B)−W (r)(B − u)) < ∞ by Lemma A.1.
Therefore, the result follows. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. (1) In view of (a)-(c) in Subsection 3.3, we shall show that (i) Ψ(A,B) monotonically
increases while (ii) Ψ(A,B) monotonically decreases in B.
(i) By the assumption A > 0, we have ψ̂(A,∞) = 0. This coupled with the fact that ψ̂(A,B) is
decreasing in B by Lemma 3.4-(2) shows that ψ̂(A,B) > 0 or ψ(A,B) > 0 for every B > A and hence
Ψ(A,B) is monotonically increasing in B on (A,∞) (recall ψ(A,B) = ∂Ψ(A,B)/∂B). Furthermore,
b(A) < ∞ implies that Ψ̂(A,∞) > 0 (note Ψ̂(A,B) > 0 ⇐⇒ Ψ(A,B) > 0). This together with
W (r)(B − A) B↑∞−−−→∞ implies that Ψ(A,B) is monotonically increasing in B to +∞.
(ii) Because A ≥ A, we obtain A > 0 and hence ψ̂(A,A+) = 0. This together with the fact that
ψ̂(A,B) is decreasing in B by Lemma 3.4-(2) shows that ψ̂(A,B) < 0, or ψ(A,B) < 0, for every B > A.
Consequently, Ψ(A,B) is monotonically decreasing in B on (A,∞). Furthermore, because Ψ(A,A+) < 0
by Lemma 3.3-(3), Ψ(A,B) never up-crosses the level zero.
By (i) and (ii) and the continuity of Ψ and ψ with respect to both A and B, there must exist A∗ ∈ (A,A)
and B∗ ∈ (A∗,∞) such that B∗ = b(A∗) = b(A∗) (with Ψ(A∗, B∗) = ψ(A∗, B∗) = 0).
(2) Using the same argument as in (1)-(i) above, Ψ(A,B) is increasing in B on (A,∞). Moreover,
the assumption b(A) = ∞ means that −∞ < Ψ(A,A+) ≤ limB↑∞Ψ(A,B) ≤ 0. This together with
W (r)(B − A) B↑∞−−−→ ∞ shows Ψ̂(A,∞) = 0. By (3.13) and (3.37), ψ̂(A,∞) = 0 and this implies that
ψ̂(A,B) > 0 for all B ∈ (A,∞) by virtue of Lemma 3.4-(2), and hence b(A) =∞.
(3) Recall Lemma 3.4-(3). We have ψ(0, B) > 0 if and only if B ∈ (0, b(0)), and hence Ψ(0, ·) attains
a global maximum Ψ(0, b(0)) and it is strictly larger than zero because b(0) < b(0). Furthermore, Ψ(A,B)
is monotonically decreasing in B on (A,∞) and Ψ(A,A+) < 0 as in (1)-(ii). This together with the same
argument as in (1) shows the result.
(4) First, A = 0 implies b(0) = 0. This also means that ψ̂(0, B) ≤ 0 or Ψ(0, B) is decreasing on (0,∞).
This together with Lemma 3.3-(3) shows b(0) = ∞. Now, for both (i) and (ii) for every B ∈ [b(0), b(0)],
because ψ(0, B) ≤ 0, we must have Ψ̂(0, B)− ψ̂(0, B) W (r)(B)
W (r)
′
(B)
≥ Ψ̂(0, B). This shows that b(0) ≤ b(0). It
is clear that this is case 3 when b(0) <∞ whereas this is case 4 when b(0) =∞. 
Proof of Lemma 3.5. (1) With W (r)(B − A) > 0, it is sufficient to show Ψ(A,B) is decreasing in A on
(A,A) for every fixed B. Indeed, the derivative
∂
∂A
Ψ(A,B) =
∂
∂A
[
−
( p˜
r
+ γs
)
Z(r)(B − A) + (α˜− γs)κ(B;A)
]
(A.6)
= W (r)(B − A) (p˜+ rγs − (α˜− γs)Π(A,∞)) (A.7)
is negative for every A ∈ (0, A) by the definition of A. Part (2) is immediate from Lemma 3.4-(1). 
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Proof of Lemma 3.6. (1) Fix B∗ > x > A > A∗ > 0. First, suppose B∗ <∞. We compute the derivative:
∂
∂A
(vA,B∗(x)− g(x)) = ∂
∂A
Υ(x;A,B∗) =
[ ∂
∂A
W (r)(x− A)
W (r)(B∗ − A)
]
Ψ(A,B∗)
+
W (r)(x− A)
W (r)(B∗ − A)
∂
∂A
Ψ(A,B∗) +
∂
∂A
[( p˜
r
+ γs
)
Z(r)(x− A)− (α˜− γs)κ(x;A)
]
.
Using (A.7), the last two terms of the above cancel out and
∂
∂A
(vA,B∗(x)− g(x)) =
[ ∂
∂A
W (r)(x− A)
W (r)(B∗ − A)
]
Ψ(A,B∗).
On the right-hand side, the derivative is given by
∂
∂A
W (r)(x− A)
W (r)(B∗ − A) = e
−Φ(r)(B∗−x) ∂
∂A
WΦ(r)(x− A)
WΦ(r)(B∗ − A)
= e−Φ(r)(B
∗−x)−W ′Φ(r)(x− A)WΦ(r)(B∗ − A) +WΦ(r)(x− A)W ′Φ(r)(B∗ − A)
WΦ(r)(B∗ − A)2
which is negative according to (3.12) by B∗ > x. Now suppose B∗ =∞. We have
∂
∂A
(vA,∞(x)−g(x)) = ∂
∂A
[
W (r)(x− A)Ψ̂(A,∞)
]
+
∂
∂A
[( p˜
r
+γs
)
Z(r)(x−A)−(α˜− γs)κ(x;A)
]
.
By (3.20), the first term becomes
∂
∂A
[
W (r)(x− A)Ψ̂(A,∞)
]
= −W (r)′(x− A)Ψ̂(A,∞)− (α˜− γs)W (r)(x− A)
∫ ∞
A
Π(du)e−Φ(r)(u−A),
and by using the last equality of (A.7) (with B replaced with x), we obtain
− (α˜− γs)W (r)(x− A)
∫ ∞
A
Π(du)e−Φ(r)(u−A) +
∂
∂A
[( p˜
r
+ γs
)
Z(r)(x− A)− (α˜− γs)κ(x;A)
]
= W (r)(x− A) (−(p˜+ rγs) + (α˜− γs)ρ(A)) = W (r)(x− A)Φ(r)Ψ̂(A,∞).
Hence,
∂
∂A
(vA,∞(x)− g(x)) = −
[
W (r)
′
(x− A)− Φ(r)W (r)(x− A)
]
Ψ̂(A,∞) = −eΦ(r)(x−A)W ′Φ(r)(x− A)Ψ̂(A,∞)
where W ′Φ(r)(x− A) > 0 because WΦ(r) is increasing.
Now in order to show vA,B∗(x)−g(x) is increasing in A on (A∗, x), it is sufficient to show Ψ̂(A,B∗) ≤ 0
for every A∗ < A < B∗. This is true for A∗ < A < A by b(A∗) = B∗ and Lemma 3.5-(1). This holds
also for A ≤ A < B∗. Indeed, Ψ(A,B) is decreasing in B because, for any B > A > A, ψ̂(A,A+) < 0
and Lemma 3.4-(2) imply ψ(A,B) ≤ 0. Furthermore, Lemma 3.3-(3) shows that Ψ(A,A+) < 0. Hence
Ψ(A,B∗) ≤ 0 or Ψ̂(A,B∗) ≤ 0.
Now we have by (3.29), 0 ≥ W (r)(0)Ψ̂(x,B∗) = vx,B∗(x+) − g(x) ≥ vA∗,B∗(x) − g(x). This proves
(3.42) for the case A∗ > 0. Since v0+,B∗(x) = limA↓0 vA,B∗(x) by (3.16) and (3.25), this also shows for the
case A∗ = 0.
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(2) Recall that ψ(A∗, B) = ∂Ψ(A∗, B)/∂B and hence for any A∗ < x < B < B∗
∂
∂B
(vA∗,B(x)− h(x)) = ∂
∂B
Υ(x;A∗, B)
=
W (r)(x− A∗)
(W (r)(B − A∗))2
[
ψ(A∗, B)W (r)(B − A∗)−Ψ(A∗, B)W (r)′(B − A∗)]
= −W (r)(x− A∗)W
(r)′(B − A∗)
W (r)(B − A∗)
(
Ψ̂(A∗, B)− ψ̂(A∗, B)W
(r)(B − A∗)
W (r)′(B − A∗)
)
which is positive for B ∈ (A∗, B∗) by Remark 3.5-(1). Therefore, by (3.28), 0 = vA∗,x(x−) − h(x) ≤
vA∗,B∗(x)− h(x).
This proves (3.43) for the case B∗ < ∞. Since vA∗,∞(x) = limB↑∞ vA∗,B(x) by (3.16) and (3.23), this
also shows for the case B∗ =∞. 
Proof of Lemma 3.7. (1) Suppose A∗ > 0. Because XσA∗∧τ > A
∗ a.s. on {τ < σA∗ , τ <∞}, XσA∗∧τ ≤ A∗
a.s. on {τ ≥ σA∗ , σA∗ <∞} and by (3.43), we have on {τ ∧ σA∗ <∞}
g(XσA∗ )1{σA∗<τ} + h(Xτ )1{τ<σA∗} ≤ g(XσA∗ )1{σA∗<τ} + vA∗,B∗(Xτ )1{τ<σA∗}
= vA∗,B∗(XσA∗ )1{σA∗<τ} + vA∗,B∗(Xτ )1{τ<σA∗} = vA∗,B∗(XσA∗∧τ ).
Suppose A∗ = 0. We have, by (3.43), on {τ <∞}
−(α˜− γs)1{Xτ=0} + h(Xτ )1{τ<σ0} ≤ −(α˜− γs)1{Xτ=0} + v0+,B∗(Xτ )1{τ<σ0} = v0+,B∗(Xτ ).
The proof for (2) is similar thanks to (3.42). 
Proof of Lemma 3.8. (1) First, Lemma 3.4 of [27] shows that (L− r)ζ(x) = 0. Therefore, using (3.38) and
that J ′ = J ′′ = 0 on (0, A∗), we have
(L − r)vA∗,B∗(x) =
∫ ∞
x
(J(x− u)− J(x)) Π(du)− rJ(x) = (α˜− γs) Π(x,∞)− (rγs + p˜). (A.8)
Since A∗ > 0, we must have by construction Ψ̂(A∗, B∗) = 0 and Ψ̂(A∗, B∗)− ψ̂(A∗, B∗) W (r)(B∗−A∗)
W (r)
′
(B∗−A∗) = 0
and consequently, ψ̂(A∗, B∗) = 0. Furthermore, ψ̂(A∗, B) is decreasing in B and hence ψ̂(A∗, A∗+) =
(α˜− γs) Π(A∗,∞)− (p˜+ γsr) > 0. Applying this to (A.8), for x < A∗, it follows that (L− r)vA∗,B∗(x) >
0.
(2) When A∗ > 0, by the strong Markov property,
e−r(t∧σA∗∧τB∗ )vA∗,B∗(Xt∧σA∗∧τB∗ )
= Ex
[
e−r(τB∗∧σA∗ )
(
h(XτB∗ )1{τB∗<σA∗} + g(XσA∗ )1{τB∗>σA∗}
)
1{τB∗∧σA∗<∞}
∣∣Ft∧σA∗∧τB∗] .
Taking expectation on both sides, we see that e−r(t∧σA∗∧τB∗ )vA∗,B∗(Xt∧σA∗∧τB∗ ) is a Px-martingale and
hence (L − r)vA∗,B∗(x) = 0 on (A∗, B∗) (see Remark 3.2 and the Appendix of [7]).
When A∗ = 0 by Remark 3.4
e−r(t∧τB∗ )v0+,B∗(Xt∧τB∗ ) = E
x
[
e−rτB∗
(
h(XτB∗ )1{τB∗<σ0} − (α˜− γs)1{XτB∗=0}
)
1{τB∗<∞}
∣∣Ft∧τB∗].
Taking expectation on both sides, we see that e−r(t∧τB∗ )v0+,B∗(Xt∧τB∗ ) is a Px-martingale and hence (L −
r)v0+,B∗(x) = 0 on (0, B∗).
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(3) Suppose ν > 0, i.e. there is a Gaussian component. In this case, W (r) is continuous on R and C2 on
(0,∞), and we have
v′′A∗,B∗(B
∗−)− h′′(B∗) = W (r)′′(B∗ − A∗)Ψ̂(A∗, B∗)
+ (p˜+ γsr)W
(r)′(B∗ − A∗)− (α˜− γs)
∫ ∞
A∗
Π(du)
(
W (r)
′
(B∗ − A∗)−W (r)′(B∗ − u)).
We show v′′A∗,B∗(B
∗−) − h′′(B∗) ≥ 0. To this end, we suppose v′′A∗,B∗(B∗−) − h′′(B∗) < 0 and derive
contradiction. The fact that v′A∗,B∗(B
∗−) − h′(B∗) = 0 by smooth fit implies that v′A∗,B∗(x) − h′(x) > 0
for some x ∈ (B∗ − ε, B∗). However, since vA∗,B∗(B∗−) − h(B∗) = 0, this would contradict (3.43).
Consequently, v′′A∗,B∗(B
∗−)− h′′(B∗) ≥ 0, implying (L − r)vA∗,B∗(B∗+) ≤ (L − r)vA∗,B∗(B∗−). When
ν = 0, (L − r)vA∗,B∗(B∗+) = (L − r)vA∗,B∗(B∗−) by continuous and smooth fit.
As a result, for all cases, we conclude that (L − r)vA∗,B∗(B∗+) ≤ (L − r)vA∗,B∗(B∗−) = 0. Now
it is sufficient to show that (L − r)vA∗,B∗(x) is decreasing on (B∗,∞). Recall the decomposition (3.38).
Because (L − r)ζ(x) = 0, we shall show (L − r)J(x) is decreasing on (A∗, B∗).
Now because J ′ = J ′′ = 0 on x > B∗,
(L − r)J(x) =
∫ ∞
x−B∗
Π(du)
[
J(x− u)−
(p
r
− γb
)]
− (p− rγb), x > B∗.
Since vA∗,B∗(x) ≥ h(x), we must have that J(x) ≥ pr − γb on x < B∗ (or the integrand of the above is
non-negative). In order to show that this is decreasing, we show that J in (3.39) is decreasing on (−∞, B∗).
By continuous fit at A∗ (when A∗ > 0), it is sufficient to show that Υ(x;A∗, B∗) is decreasing for every
x ∈ (A∗, B∗). By Remark 3.5-(3), we must have Ψ̂(A∗, B∗) − ψ̂(A∗, B∗) W (r)(B∗−A∗)
W (r)
′
(B∗−A∗) = 0, and hence by
(3.12) and because Ψ(A∗, B∗) ≤ 0 as in Remark 3.5-(1),
0 =
W (r)
′
(B∗ − A∗)
W (r)(B∗ − A∗) Ψ(A
∗, B∗)− ψ(A∗, B∗) ≥ W
(r)′(x− A∗)
W (r)(x− A∗) Ψ(A
∗, B∗)− ψ(A∗, B∗).
After multiplying by W (r)(x−A∗)/W (r)(B∗−A∗) on both sides and observing ψ̂(A∗, x) is decreasing in x
by Lemma 3.4, we get 0 ≥ W (r)′(x−A∗)Ψ̂(A∗, B∗)−W (r)(x−A∗)ψ̂(A∗, B∗) ≥ W (r)′(x−A∗)Ψ̂(A∗, B∗)−
W (r)(x − A∗)ψ̂(A∗, x), which matches Υ′(x;A∗, B∗) in (3.31). Hence, Υ(x;A∗, B∗) is decreasing, as
desired. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. (i) We show that vA∗,B∗(x) ≥ v(x;σA∗ , τ) for every τ ∈ S. As is discussed in
Remark 3.6, we only need to focus on the set SA∗ .
In order to handle the discontinuity of vA∗,B∗ at zero, we first construct a sequence of functions vn(·)
such that it is continuous on R, vn(x) = vA∗,B∗(x) on x ∈ (0,∞) and (c) vn(x) ↑ vA∗,B∗(x) pointwise for
every fixed x ∈ (−∞, 0). Notice that vA∗,B∗(·) is uniformly bounded because h(·) and g(·) are. Hence, we
can choose so that vn is also uniformly bounded for every fixed n ≥ 1. Because v′A∗,B∗(x) = v′n(x) and
v′′A∗,B∗(x) = v
′′
n(x) on x ∈ (0,∞)\{A∗, B∗} and vA∗,B∗(x) ≥ vn(x) on (−∞, 0), we have
(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(x) ≤ 0, x ∈ (0,∞)\{A∗, B∗}. (A.9)
We have for any τ ∈ SA∗ , Ex
[∫ τ∧σA∗
0
e−rs|(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)|ds
] ≤ KEx [∫ σA∗
0
e−rsΠ(Xs−,∞)ds
]
where K := supx∈R |vA∗,B∗(x) − vn(x)| < ∞ is the maximum difference between vA∗,B∗ and vn. Using
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N as the Poisson random measure for the jumps of −X and X as the running minimum of X , by the
compensation formula [23, Theorem 4.4],
Ex
[∫ σA∗
0
e−rsΠ(Xs−,∞)ds
]
= Ex
[∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
e−rs1{Xs−>A∗, u>Xs−}Π(du)ds
]
= Ex
[∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
e−rs1{Xs−>A∗, u>Xs−}N(du× ds)
]
= Ex
[
e−rσA∗1{XσA∗<0, σA∗<∞}
]
<∞.
Therefore, uniformly for any n ≥ 1,
Ex
[∫ τ∧σA∗
0
e−rs|(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)|ds
]
<∞,∫ τ∧σA∗
0
e−rs|(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)|ds <∞, Px-a.s.
(A.10)
By applying Ito’s formula to
{
e−r(t∧σA∗ )vn(Xt∧σA∗ ); t ≥ 0
}
(here we assume A∗ > 0), we see that{
e−r(t∧σA∗ )vn(Xt∧σA∗ )−
∫ t∧σA∗
0
e−rs(L − r)vn(Xs−)ds; t ≥ 0
}
(A.11)
is a local martingale. Here the C2 (C1) condition at {A∗, B∗} for the case X is of unbounded (bounded)
variation can be relaxed by a version of Meyer-Ito formula as in Theorem IV.71 of [32] (see also Theorem
2.1 of [30]).
Suppose {Tk; k ≥ 1} is the corresponding localizing sequence, namely,
Ex
[
e−r(t∧σA∗∧Tk)vn(Xt∧σA∗∧Tk)
]
= vn(x) + Ex
[∫ t∧σA∗∧Tk
0
e−rs(L − r)vn(Xs−)ds
]
.
Now by applying the dominated convergence theorem on the left-hand side and Fatou’s lemma on the right-
hand side via (L − r)vn(x) ≤ 0 for every x > 0 thanks to (A.9) and Lemma 3.8-(2,3), we obtain
Ex
[
e−r(t∧σA∗ )vn(Xt∧σA∗ )
] ≤ vn(x) + Ex [∫ t∧σA∗
0
e−rs(L − r)vn(Xs−)ds
]
.
Hence (A.11) is a supermartingale.
Now fix τ ∈ SA∗ . By optional sampling theorem, we have for any M ≥ 0
Ex
[
e−r(τ∧σA∗∧M)vn(Xτ∧σA∗∧M)
]
≤ vn(x) + Ex
[∫ τ∧σA∗∧M
0
e−rs ((L − r)vA∗,B∗(Xs−) + (L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)) ds
]
≤ vn(x) + Ex
[∫ τ∧σA∗∧M
0
e−rs(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds
]
,
where the last inequality holds by Lemma 3.8-(2,3). Applying the dominated convergence theorem on both
sides via (A.10), we obtain the inequality:
Ex
[
e−r(τ∧σA∗ )vn(Xτ∧σA∗ )1{τ∧σA∗<∞}
] ≤ vn(x) + Ex [∫ τ∧σA∗
0
e−rs(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds
]
.
(A.12)
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We shall take n→∞ on both sides. For the left-hand side, the dominated convergence theorem implies
lim
n→∞
Ex
[
e−r(τ∧σA∗ )vn(Xτ∧σA∗ )1{τ∧σA∗<∞}
]
= Ex
[
e−r(τ∧σA∗ )vA∗,B∗(Xτ∧σA∗ )1{τ∧σA∗<∞}
]
.
For the right-hand side, we again apply the dominated convergence theorem via (A.10) to get
lim
n→∞
Ex
[∫ τ∧σA∗
0
e−rs(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds
]
= Ex
[
lim
n→∞
∫ τ∧σA∗
0
e−rs(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds
]
. (A.13)
Now fix Px-a.e. ω ∈ Ω. By (A.10) dominated convergence yields limn→∞
∫ τ(ω)∧σA∗ (ω)
0
e−rs(L − r)(vn −
vA∗,B∗)(Xs−(ω))ds =
∫ τ(ω)∧σA∗ (ω)
0
e−rs limn→∞(L− r)(vn− vA∗,B∗)(Xs−(ω))ds. Finally, since Xs−(ω) >
A∗ for Lebesgue-a.e. s on (0, τ(ω) ∧ σA∗(ω)), and by the dominated convergence theorem, limn→∞(L −
r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−(ω)) =
∫∞
Xs−(ω)
Π(du) limn→∞ (vn(Xs−(ω)− u)− vA∗,B∗(Xs−(ω)− u)) = 0. Hence,
the limit (A.13) vanishes. Therefore, by taking n→∞ in (A.12) (note vA∗,B∗(x) = vn(x)), we have
vA∗,B∗(x) ≥ Ex
[
e−r(τ∧σA∗ )vA∗,B∗(Xτ∧σA∗ )1{τ∧σA∗<∞}
]
, τ ∈ SA∗ .
This inequality and Lemma 3.7-(1) show that vA∗,B∗(x) ≥ v(x;σA∗ , τ) for any arbitrary τ ∈ SA∗ .
(ii) Next, we show that vA∗,B∗(x) ≤ v(x;σ, τB∗) for every σ ∈ S . Similarly to (i), we only need to focus
on the set SB∗ . We again use {vn;n ≥ 1} defined in (i). Using the same argument as in (i), we obtain
Ex
[∫ σ∧τB∗
0
e−rs|(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)|ds
]
<∞,∫ σ∧τB∗
0
e−rs|(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)|ds <∞, Px − a.s.,
(A.14)
uniformly for any n ≥ 1.
Because vn is not assumed to be C1 nor C2 at zero, we follow the approach by [28]. Fix  > 0. By
applying Ito’s formula to
{
e−r(t∧τB∗∧σ)vn(Xt∧τB∗∧σ); t ≥ 0
}
, we see that{
e−r(t∧τB∗∧σ)vn(Xt∧τB∗∧σ)−
∫ t∧τB∗∧σ
0
e−rs(L − r)vn(Xs−)ds; t ≥ 0
}
(A.15)
is a local martingale. Suppose {Tk; k ≥ 1} is the corresponding localizing sequence, we have
Ex
[
e−r(t∧τB∗∧σ∧Tk)vn(Xt∧τB∗∧σ∧Tk)
]
= vn(x) + Ex
[∫ t∧τB∗∧σ∧Tk
0
e−rs(L − r)vn(Xs−)ds
]
= vn(x) + Ex
[∫ t∧τB∗∧σ∧Tk
0
e−rs ((L − r)vA∗,B∗(Xs−) + (L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)) ds
]
= vn(x) + Ex
[∫ t∧τB∗∧σ∧Tk
0
e−rs(L − r)vA∗,B∗(Xs−)ds
]
+ Ex
[∫ t∧τB∗∧σ∧Tk
0
e−rs(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds
]
where we can split the expectation by (A.14). Now by applying the dominated convergence theorem on the
left-hand side and the monotone convergence theorem and the dominated convergence theorem respectively
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on the two expectations on the right-hand side (using respectively Lemma 3.8-(1,2) and (A.14)), we obtain
Ex
[
e−r(t∧τB∗∧σ)vn(Xt∧τB∗∧σ)
]
= vn(x) + Ex
[∫ t∧τB∗∧σ
0
e−rs(L − r)vn(Xs−)ds
]
.
Hence (A.15) is a martingale.
Now fix σ ∈ SB∗ . By the optional sampling theorem, we have for any M ≥ 0 using Lemma 3.8-(1,2)
Ex
[
e−r(σ∧τB∗∧σ∧M)vn(Xσ∧τB∗∧σ∧M)
]
= vn(x) + Ex
[∫ σ∧τB∗∧σ∧M
0
e−rs(L − r)vn(Xs−)ds
]
≥ vn(x) + Ex
[∫ σ∧τB∗∧σ∧M
0
e−rs(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds
]
.
Applying the dominated convergence theorem on both sides by (A.14), we have
Ex
[
e−r(σ∧τB∗∧σ)vn(Xσ∧τB∗∧σ)1{σ∧τB∗∧σ<∞}
] ≥ vn(x) + Ex [∫ σ∧τB∗∧σ
0
e−rs(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds
]
.
Because σ → σ0 (τB∗ ∧ σ → τB∗ ) a.s., the bounded convergence theorem yields
Ex
[
e−r(σ∧τB∗ )vn(Xσ∧τB∗ )1{σ∧τB∗<∞}
] ≥ vn(x) + Ex [∫ σ∧τB∗
0
e−rs(L − r)(vn − vA∗,B∗)(Xs−)ds
]
.
Finally, we can take n→∞ on both sides along the same line as in (i) and we obtain
vA∗,B∗(x) ≤ Ex
[
e−r(σ∧τB∗ ) lim
n→∞
vn(Xσ∧τB∗ )1{σ∧τB∗<∞}
]
= Ex
[
e−r(σ∧τB∗ )(vA∗,B∗(Xσ∧τB∗ )1{Xσ∧τB∗ 6=0} + vA∗,B∗(0+)1{Xσ∧τB∗=0})1{σ∧τB∗<∞}
]
≤ Ex [e−r(σ∧τB∗ )vA∗,B∗(Xσ∧τB∗ )1{σ∧τB∗<∞}] .
This together with Lemma 3.7-(2) shows that vA∗,B∗(x) ≤ v(x;σ, τB∗) for any arbitrary σ ∈ SB∗ . 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. When ν = 0, then the same results as (i) of the proof of Theorem 3.1 hold by
replacing A∗ with 0 and τA∗ with σ0. Now suppose ν > 0. Using the same argument as in the proof of
Theorem 3.1 with τA∗ replaced with σ0 and the argument with σ as in (ii) of the proof of Theorem 3.1,
the supermartingale property of
{
e−r(t∧σ0)v0+,B∗(Xt∧σ0); t ≥ 0
}
holds. This together with Lemma 3.7-(1)
shows, for any τ ∈ S,
v0+,B∗(x) ≥ Ex
[
e−rτv0+,B∗(Xτ )1{τ<∞}
] ≥ Ex [e−rτ (h(Xτ )1{τ<σ0} − (α˜− γs)1{Xτ=0})1{τ<∞}] = v(x;σ0+, τ).
As in the proof of Lemma 3.8-(2),
{
e−r(t∧τB∗ )v0+,B∗(Xt∧τB∗ ); t ≥ 0
}
is a martingale. This together with
Lemma 3.7-(2) shows that v0+,B∗(x) ≤ v(x;σ, τB∗) for all σ ∈ SB∗ . 
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